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PLEADING DISABILITY
JOSEPH A. SEINER*
Abstract: A significant failre. That is how the Americans with Disabilities
Act ("ADA") has been described by legal scholars and disability advocates
alike. The statute was widely expected to help prevent disability discrimina-
tion in employment, but it has not fully achieved its intended purpose be-
cause of the narrow interpretation of the ADA by the courts. Congress re-
cently sought to restore the employment protections of the ADA by amend-
ing the statute. Interpreting the complex and comprehensive amendments
to the ADA will be a difficult task for the federal courts. Complicating mat-
ters further, the proper pleading standard for disability claims was left in
disarray after the U.S. Supreme Court's decisions in 2007 in Twombly v. Bell
Atlantic Coip., and in 2009 in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, which altered fifty years of fed-
eral pleading precedent by extending the plausibility standard to all civil
matters. This Article examines the impact of the Bell Atlantic decision on
ADA claims and proposes a unified analytical framework for alleging dis-
ability discrimination that satisfies recent case law, the ADA amendments,
and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The proposed model would
streamline the pleading process for disability claims and provide a blue-
print for litigants and courts in analyzing cases under the revised ADA.
I seldom think about my limitations, and they never make me sad. Perhaps
there is just a touch of yearning at times, but it is vague, like a breeze among
flowers. The wind passes, and the flowers are content.
-Helen Keller
INTRODUCTION
Former Vice President Hubert H. Humphrey once observed that
"[t]he moral test of government is how that government treats" the dis-
* Joseph Seiner is an assistant professor at the University of South Carolina School of
Law. The author would like to thank Lisa Eichhorn, Benjamin Gutman, and Daniel Vail for
their generous assistance with this Article. The author also acknowledges the loving sup-
port of his wife, Megan, that made this Article possible. This Article is dedicated to Joseph
Sweeney Seiner-always remember that you can achieve whatever you desire. Any errors,
miscalculations, or misstatements are entirely those of the author.
I Alden Whitman, Helen Kellei, 87, Dies, N.Y. TiIEs, June 2, 1968, availabic at http://www.
nytimes.com/learning/general/onthisday/bday/0627.html. This quotation was included in
Helen Keller's obituary. Id.
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abled.2 The Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 ("ADA") was a sig-
nificant attempt on the part of the government to level the playing field
for individuals with disabilities: and to do so, the statute provides nu-
merous protections against employment discrimination.3 Unfortunately,
however, the U.S. Supreme Court has taken a very narrow approach to
the issue of coverage under the statute, and the federal courts (follow-
ing the Supreme Court's lead) have not been sympathetic to disability
discrimination claims.4
Congress recently responded to the federal courts' narrowing of
disability protections by enacting the ADA Amendments Act of 2008
("ADAAA" or "amendments"), which took effect on January 1, 2009.5
The amendments provide that Congress's expectation of broad cover-
age under the statute "has not been fulfilled,"6 and that the Supreme
Court has too narrowly construed the meaning of the term "disability"
in its decisions.7 Through the amendments, Congress sought to "rein-
statte] a broad scope of protection" under the statute.8 These recent
amendments favoring broad coverage under the ADA will require the
courts to analyze disability claims more closely. The complexity of the
new provisions, however, will make this a difficult task.
Complicating matters further, in the 2007 case, Twoinbly v. Bell At-
lantic Coip.,9 the U.S. Supreme Court "retire [d] "10 fifty years of pleading
precedent by abandoning the well-established standard from Conley v.
Gibson," that a complaint must be allowed to proceed unless "the plain-
tiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle
him to relief." 2 In its place, the Court adopted a new standard requir-
2 See Susan Rozelle, Fear and Loathing in Insanity Law: Explaining the Otherwisc Inexplica-
ble Clark v. Arizona, 58 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 19, 23 n.16 (2007).
Sec42 U.S.C. §§ 12111-12117 (2006) (statutory provisions ofTitle I of ADA).
See Charles Craver, The Judicial Disabling of the Employment Discrimination Provisions of
the Americans with Disabilities Act. 18 LAB. LAw. 417, 418 (2003) ("A series of recent Su-
preme Court decisions has narrowed the scope of ADA coverage to severely limit statutory
protection to individuals with relatively severe disabilities."); Alex Long, Introducing the New
and Improved Americans with Disabilities Act: Assessing the ADA Amendnients Act of 2008, 103
Nw. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 217, 217 (2008) ("Studies consistently reveal that, despite the
ADA, employees who claim to be the victims of disability discrimination in the workplace
face long odds.").
ADAAA, Pub. L. No. 110-325, §§ 2(a) (3), 8, 122 Stat. 3553, 3553 (2008).
6 Id. §§ 1, 2(a) (3), 122 Stat. 3553, 3553.
Id. § 2(a) (4)-(5), 122 Stat. 3553, 3553.
8 Id. § 2(b) (1), 122 Stat. 3553, 3554.
9550 U.S. 544 (2007).
10 Id. at 563.
1 See 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957).
12 Id.
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ing that a plaintiffs complaint allege "enough facts to state a claim to
relief that is plausible on its face."13 Though Bell Atlantic arose in the
context of a complex antitrust case, the decision has been applied to
disability claims by federal courts in almost every circuit." Additionally,
in 2009, in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, the Supreme Court clarified that the Bell
Atlantic standard applies to "all civil actions," including "antitrust and
discrimination suits alike."15 Studies already suggest that the plausibility
standard is having an impact in employment discrimination and civil
rights cases.' 6
There has been only limited examination of the impact of the Bell
Atlantic decision on disability discrimination claims, and this Article
seeks to fill this void in the scholarship.17 I recently examined approxi-
mately 500 federal district court opinions from the year before and af-
ter the Supreme Court's ruling.'8 The results of this study reveal a
higher percentage of district court opinions granting motions to dis-
miss in the disability context in the year following the Bell Atlantic deci-
sion co'mpared to the year prior to the Supreme Court case.'9 This
study specifically compared those decisions issued prior to Bell Atlantic
that relied on Conley to those decisions issued after Bell Atlantic that re-
lied on BellAtlantic.20 An individual examination of these cases was even
more revealing, however, as the opinions do not reflect that the courts
are uniformly using the plausibility standard to dismiss disability
claims.2 ' Rather, the review of the decisions suggests a significant
amount of confusion over the proper pleading standard to apply and a
conflict in the courts over the level of specificity needed to allege a dis-
ability claim in the employment context.22
When pleading a disability case, then, litigants are receiving con-
flicting signals.23 After Bell Atlantic, the lower courts are in disarray over
the amount of specificity that must be alleged in the complaint, with
13Bdl Atlantic, 550 U.S. at 570 (emphasis added).
14 See infra notes 216-242 and cases accompanying note 212.
15 Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1953 (2009).
16 See infra note 173 and accompanying text.
1 See gencrally Patricia W. Hatamyar, The Tao of Pleading: Do Twombly and Iqbal Matter
Empiically?, A.. U. L. REV. (forthcoming) (manuscript at 35, 58, available at http://pa-
pers.ssrn .com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract id=1487764#) (performing empirical analysis of
impact of Troombly and Iqbal on various claims and briefly addressing ADA claims).
1s Scc infa notes 176-190 and accompanying text.
19 See infra notes 191-192 and accompanying text.
20 See infra notes 176-190 and accompanying text.
21 See infra notes 210-242 and accompanying text.
22 See infra notes 210-266 and accompanying text.
23 See infra notes 210-266 and accompanying text.
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some courts imposing a highly demanding standard. 24 At the same time,
Congress has attempted to relax the standards for proving a disability
claim under the ADA through the recent amendments to the statute.28
Unfortunately, the confusion already faced by the courts and litigants in
applying the Bell Atlantic decision to disability claims will only intensify as
the courts begin to grapple with how to interpret the revised statute.
There is no reason that alleging an ADA discrimination claim need be a
complicated or complex process: a unified pleading standard would
bring consistency to this area of the law and resolve the current confu-
sion over what must be alleged in a disability plaintiffs complaint.
This Article attempts to provide the simplicity so sorely needed in
this area of the law and resolve the current confusion over the proper
pleading standard by proposing a new analytical framework for claims
of disability discrimination.26 The model presented in this Article ad-
dresses the two primary types of disability claims brought under the
ADA in the employment context-those claims alleging an adverse
employment action on the basis of disability and those claims asserting
the denial of a reasonable accommodation by the employer.27 Address-
ing each of these claims in turn, this Article proposes a unified plead-
ing framework for alleging disability discrimination.28 The model set
forth below is intended to serve as a blueprint for the courts and liti-
gants on disability pleading, and will hopefilly remove the guesswork
from this area of the law, thus resulting in a significant savings of judi-
cial resources. 29
This Article begins by explaining the federal pleading rules and
examining the Supreme Court's Bell Atlantic decision (as recently con-
firmed by Iqbal), which altered the legal landscape for employment dis-
crimination plaintiffs.30 Next, this Article explores the basic structure of
the ADA and provides a detailed analysis of how the recent amend-
ments to the statute will affect disability discrimination suits.31 Then,
this Article provides an analysis of the impact of the Bell Atlantic deci-
sion on disability claims and explains how that analysis reveals a signifi-
cant level of confusion in the federal courts over the proper pleading
2 See info notes 54-73 and accompanying text.
21 See info notes 107-169 and accompanying text.
26 See infra notes 267-366 and accompanying text.
2 See info notes 267-366 and accompanying text.
28 See infm notes 267-366 and accompanying text.
2 Sec infra notes 267-366 and accompanying text.
3 Sec infra notes 36-73 and accompanying text.
31 Sec infra notes 74-169 and accompanying text.
98 [Vol. 51:95
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standard in ADA cases.32 Finally, this Article attempts to resolve the ex-
isting confusion l6y providing a unified analytical framework for analyz-
ing disability claims.33 This proposed new model specifically addresses
adverse action and failure-to-accommodate cases that are brought in-
der the ADA." The Article concludes by exploring the possible implica-
tions of adopting the proposed framework.35
I. DISMISSAL UNDER FEDERAL LAW
A. The Development of the Federal Pleading Standard
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure ("federal rules") are ex-
tremely clear on the standard for pleading a claim. Rule 8(a) (2) states
that a plaintiff must set forth in the complaint "a short and plain state-
ment of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief."36 This
simple requirement, however, has generated enormous controversy. In
1957, in Conley v. Gibson, the U.S. Supreme Court attempted to resolve
any ambiguity over the federal pleading standard, emphasizing that a
litigant's complaint should be liberally construed.37 The Conley Court
established a clear and concise standard for asserting a claim, holding
that "a complaint should not be dismissed for failure to state a claim
unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set offacts
in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief."38
The straightforward, inclusive approach set forth in Conley persisted
for half of a century, until the Supreme Court's 2007 decision in Bell At-
lantic Coip. v. Twombly.39 There, the Court considered the sufficiency of a
complaint in a complex antitrust lawsuit.40 The Court revisited the
Conley decision, and "retire [d] " the "no set of facts language," holding:
- Sce infra notes 170-266 and accompanying text.
3 Sce infra notes 267-366 and accompanying text.
3 Sec infra notes 267-366 and accompanying text.
3 Sec infra notes 367-383 and accompanying text. It should be noted that while this
Article was going to print, the EEOC was in the process of revising its ADA regulations. See
infra note 149 (noting notice of proposed rulemaking for revisions to ADA regulations).
This Article thus does not contemplate those revisions-nonetheless, plaintiffs must be
cautious to comply with those revised guidelines when they are finalized.
36 FED. R. Civ. P. 8 (a) (2 ).
3 355 U.S. 41, 47-48 (1957). "The Federal Rules reject the approach that pleading is a
game of skill in which one misstep by counsel may be decisive to the outcome and accept
the principle that the purpose of pleading is to facilitate a proper decision on the merits."
Id. at 48.
3 Id. at 45-46 (emphasis added).
3 See 550 U.S. 544, 562-63 (2007).
10 Id. at 547-53.
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Conley's "no set of facts" language has been questioned, criti-
cized, and explained away long enough... [A]fter puzzling the
profession for 50 years, this famous observation has earned its
retirement. The phrase is best forgotten as an incomplete,
negative gloss on an accepted pleading standard: once a claim
has been stated adequately, it may be supported by showing any
set of facts consistent with the allegations in the complaint.41
In abandoning the "no set of facts language," the Bell Atlantic
Court replaced this standard with a plausibility requirement.42 Thus,
the Court concluded that a sufficient complaint need not include a
"heightened fact pleading of specifics, but only enough facts to state a
claim to relief that is plausible on its face."43 A complaint that fails to
cross the "line from conceivable to plausible" must be dismissed. 44 The
Bell Atlantic Court was also clear that a complaint include "more than
labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a
cause of action will not do."45 Rather, the "[f] actual allegations must be
enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level . . . on the
assumption that all the allegations in the complaint are true (even if
doubtful in fact)."46
More recently, in 2009, in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, the U.S. Supreme Court
examined the scope of the plausibility standard in a Bivens action
brought against certain federal officials, including former Attorney
General John Ashcroft and the Director of the Federal Bureau of Inves-
tigation.47 The Court clarified that the Bell Atlantic standard applies to
any civil cause of action, including "antitrust and discrimination suits
alike."48 Referencing Bell Atlantic, the Court emphasized that some fac-
tual development is required in the complaint, as pleading a civil action
"demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfily-harmed-
me accusation."4
The Court further noted that when determining whether discrimi-
natory intent has been sufficiently alleged, the "factual context" of the
41 Id. at 562-63.
42 Id. at 570.
4 Id.
4 Id.
4 550 U.S. at 555 (citations omitted).
46 Id. (citations omitted).
4 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1942-44 (2009).
48 Id. at 1953.
4 Id. at 1949.
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complaint should also be considered.50 Thus, a plaintiff cannot "plead
the bare elements of his cause of action . . . and expect his complaint to
survive a motion to dismiss."51 The Court emphasized that conclusory
allegations must fail, and that discriminatory intent cannot be asserted
"generally" 52 Thus, Iqballeaves little doubt that the BellAtlantic plausibil-
ity standard is applicable to all civil claims, and that general, conclusory
complaints cannot be permitted to stand.53 The Iqbal case is simply too
recent to allow for analyzing how the lower courts have applied the deci-
sion, though further research on this topic will provide additional guid-
ance on the contours of the plausibility standard.
B. The Impact ofBell Atlantic
The full impact of the Bell Atlantic decision is still not known. It is
clear, however, that the plausibility standard established by the Court
will not be confined to the antitrust area, and many courts have already
applied this holding to other legal contexts. 54 As noted above, in Iqbal
the Supreme Court clarified that the Bell Atlantic standard should apply
to "all civil actions."55 Legal scholars are divided, though, on whether
the plausibility standard will ultimately create a heightened pleading
requirement for plaintiffs.56
50 Id. at 1954.
5' Id.
52 Id.
5 Sec 129 S. Ct. at 1937.
5 SeeJoseph Seiner, The Trouble With Twombly: A Proposed Pleading Standard for Employ-
ment Discrimination Cases, 2009 U. ILL. L. REv. 1011, 1038 (discussing application of Bell
Atlantic to employment discrimination cases) (copyright to the University of Illinois Law
Review is held by The Board of Trustees of the University of Illinois); Kendall W. Hannon,
Note, Much Ado About Twombly? A Study on the Impact of Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly on
12(b)(6) Aotions. 83 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1811, 1814-15 (2008) ("[W]hile some commen-
tators have suggested that Twombly will only apply in the antitrust context, this study shows
that courts have applied the decision in every substantive area of law governed by Rule
8.").
5s See lqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1953 (citations omitted).
5 6 See Hannon, supra note 54, at 1824-28 (setting forth academic response to BellAtlan-
tic). Compare Allen Ides, Bell Atlantic and the Principle of Substantive Sufficiency Under Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2): Toward a Structured Approach to Federal Pleading Practice 243
F.R.D. 604, 634 (2007) ("Happily, the 'heightened pleading' interpretation of Bell Atlantic
is not a necessary interpretation. Moreover, there are at least five grounds on which that
interpretation can and ought to be resisted, i.e., aside from the fact that it is just plain
wrong."), weith Scott Dodson, Pleading Standards After Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 93 VA.
L. REV. IN BRIEF 121, 126 (2007), http://www.irginialawreview.org/inbrief/2007/07/02/
dodson.pdf ("In short, the best reading of Bell Atlantic is that Rule 8 now requires notice-
plus pleading for all cases (though especially for cases with costly discovery).").
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The limited empirical data on this issue have revealed interesting
results. In the months immediately following Bell Atlantic, it was sug-
gested that the decision had a substantial impact on the dismissal rate
of civil rights claims.57 Additionally, a recent study that I performed ex-
amined the dismissal rates of federal employment discrimination cases
brought under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 ("Title VII") in
the year before and after Bell Atlantic.58 Title VII prohibits discrimina-
tion on the basis of race, color, sex, national origin, and religion.59 The
study revealed that district courts relying on the new Supreme Court
decision granted a higher percentage of motions to dismiss brought in
the Title VII context than courts that had previously relied on Conley,
and an individual review of the decisions demonstrated that some
courts were undeniably using the Supreme Court's plausibility standard
to reject claims brought under Title VII.60
C. Pleading Employment Discimination Claims
The propensity of the U.S. district courts to use the Bell Atlantic de-
cision to dismiss civil rights cases and Title VII claims suggests that all
plaintiffs should be cautious when pleading an employment discrimina-
tion complaint.61 Interestingly, the Supreme Court's recent analysis of
the pleading requirements for employment claims suggested a more
relaxed standard, though this occurred in a pre-BellAtlanticdecision.62
In 2002, in Swierkiewicz v. Sorema, the Court considered the suffi-
ciency of a complaint brought pursuant to Title VII and the Age Dis-
crimination in Employment Act ("ADEA").63 The pleadings in the case
57 Hannon, supra note 54, at 1827 tbl. 3.
5s Seiner, supra note 54, at 1029-34. The study compared those motions to dismiss
brought in the Title VII context in the year prior to Bell Atlantic which relied on the Conley
decision to those decisions issued the year after Bell Atlanticwhich relied on the BcilAtlantic
decision. Id. at 19-21.
5 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2006) (making it unlawful "to fail or refuse to hire or to
discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect
to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such indi-
vidual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin").
6 Seiner, supra note 54, at 1029-34. See generally Hatamyar, supra note 17; Suja A. Tho-
mas, The New Sununary Judgment Motion: The Motion to Dismiss Under Iqbal and Twombly 14-
15 (Illinois Public Law Research Paper No. 09-16, 2009), available at http://ssrn.com/
abstract=1494683 (discussing empirical studies of Iqbaland Twombly decisions).
61 See Seiner, supra note 54, at 1029-34.
62 Swierkiewicz v. Sorema, 534 U.S. 506, 509-10 (2002).
63 Id.
102 [Vol. 51:95
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alleged that [plaintiff] had been terminated on account of his
national origin in violation of Title VII and on account of his
age in violation of the ADEA. [Plaintiffs] complaint detailed
the events leading to his termination, provided relevant dates,
and included the ages and nationalities of at least some of the
relevant persons involved with his termination.64
In upholding the complaint, the Court held that "it is not appro-
priate to require a plaintiff to plead facts establishing a prima facie
case."65 The Court emphasized that "the precise requirements of a
prima facie case can vary depending on the context and were 'never
intended to be rigid, mechanized, or ritualistic."' 66 The Court therefore
rejected a "heightened pleading standard" for employment discrimina-
tion cases, finding that a complaint is sufficient where it gives the defen-
dant "fair notice of what [plaintiffs] claims are and the grounds upon
which they rest."6 7
It is unclear what impact the more recent Bell Atlantic decision will
have on the pleading standard for employment discrimination cases set
forth in SwierkiewiCZ.68 At a minimum, the Swierkiewiz decision's reliance
on Conley is troubling.69 Additionally, the lower courts' rigid application
of Bell Atlantic to Title VII claims suggests that the plausibility standard
is chipping away at the more liberal pleading requirements found in
Swierkiewicz for discrimination claims.70 Nonetheless, Bell Atlantic cites
Swierkiewicz with approval, further adding to the confusion surrounding
the applicable pleading standard for employment cases.71 This confu-
sion was only intensified after the Supreme Court's recent case on
pleading standards, Ashcroft v. Iqbal, failed to cite Swierkiewicz at all.72
Thus, the fate of Swierkiewicz remains an open question after Bell Atlantic
and Iqbal, and significant uncertainty surrounds what a plaintiff must
allege to sufficiently plead a claim of employment discrimination.73
64 Id. at 514 (citation omitted).
65 Id. at 511.
66 Id. at 512 (quoting Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 577 (1978)).
67 Id. at 514.
68 See Seiner, supra note 54, at 1019-21 (discussing impact of Bell Atlantic on
Swie*ieroicz).
69 See Swic,*ieicz, 534 U.S. at 512, 514.
70 See Seiner, supra note 54, at 1029-34 (discussing results of empirical analysis of Bell
Atlantic in Title VII and civil rights claims).
71 Bell Attantic, 550 U.S. at 555, 570.
72 See Iqbal 129 S. Ct. at 1942-55.
7 Sc id. at 1953; Bell Atlantic, 550 U.S. at 555, 570. Because Bell Atlantic cites to
Swierkieoicz with approval and Iqbal does not express an opinion about the decision what-
2010] 103
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II. DISABILYTY DISCRIMINATION UNDER FEDERAL LAW
The Supreme Court has never spoken directly on the overall stan-
dard for pleading a disability discrimination case under Title I of the
ADA. Thus, determining what must be alleged to establish a sufficient
ADA complaint is largely a matter of guesswork for litigants and the
courts, particularly given the specialized nature of these claims. The
Court's decision in Swierkiewicz v. Sorema-to the extent it is still good
law-makes clear that an ADA complaint need not set forth all of the
facts necessary to establish a prima facie case.74 And from Twombly v. Bell
Atlantic Coip. and Ashcroft v. Iqbal, we now know that an ADA plaintiff
must assert a plausible claim of disability discrimination.75 How these
standards come together when fashioning the specifics of an ADA com-
plaint, however, is much less clear. And, this confusion has only in-
creased with the recent amendments to the ADA. 76 A review of the basic
requirements of the ADA, and how the recent amendments changed
the disability landscape, helps reveal the basic elements that should be
set forth in any disability claim.77
A: The Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990
Title I of the ADA, which addresses claims of discrimination in em-
ployment, went into effect on July 26, 1992.78 In passing the Act, Con-
gress noted that forty-three million Americans have some form of dis-
ability and that this number will increase over time.79 Congress also ac-
soever, it is a fair inference that Swierkiewicz remains good law at least in relation to em-
ployment discrimination cases. See Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1953; Bell Atlantic, 550 U.S. at 555,
570. At a minimum, however, Swicrkicwicz should be read in the context of Iqbal and Bell
Atlantic, as all civil claims must now satisfy the plausibility standard. Sec Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at
1953; Bell Atlan tic, 550 U.S. at 555, 570. See generally Joseph A. Seiner, After Iqbal, 45 WAKE
FOREST L. REv. (forthcoming 2010) (manuscript at 17-19, 30-33, available at http://
ssrn.com/abstract=1477519) (arguing that Swicic*ieicz is good law for Tide VII cases);
Thomas, supra note 60, at 16-18 (discussing arguments as to the viability of the Swic*iewicz
decision and concluding that the case may no longer be good law).
74 534 U.S. 506, 511 (2002).
7 See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1953 (2009); Twombly v. Bell Atlantic Corp.,
550 U.S. 544. 570 (2007).
76 ADAAA, Pub. L. No. 110-325, § 8, 122 Stat. 3553, 3559 (2008). The ADAAA went
into effect on January 1, 2009. Id.
77 See infra notes 78-169 and accompanying text.
7 See 42 U.S.C. § 12111-12117 (2006) (statutory provisions of Title I of ADA, before
ADAAA); Peter Blanck, The Burton Blatt Institute: Centers of Innovation on Disability at Syracuse
Univeisity, 56 SYRACUSE L. REv. 201, 213 n.95 (2006) (noting effective date of ADA).
7 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a) (1) (2006). This provision was recently removed as a result of
the ADAAA. ADAAA § 3.
104 [Vol. 51:95
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knowledged the propensity of our society to "isolate and segregate"
those with disabilities, including in the employment context.80 Congress
stated that a proper goal for the United States was to make certain that
individuals with disabilities enjoyed "equality of opportunity, full partici-
pation, independent living, and economic self-sufficiency."81 The pur-
pose of the ADA was clear: The statute would create a "national man-
date for the elimination of discrimination against individuals with dis-
abilities."82 And, the ADA would "provide clear, strong, consistent
enforceable standards addressing discrimination against individuals with
disabilities" that would be enforced by the federal government.83
1. Employment Provisions and Coverage
The ADA makes it unlawful for an employer with fifteen or more
employees84 to "discriminate against a qualified individual on the basis
of disability. "85 A qualified individual is defined by the act as "an individ-
ual who, with or without reasonable accommodation, can perform the
essential functions" of the job.86 In addition to prohibiting discrimina-
tion in the terms and conditions of employment,87 the ADA requires
that an employer provide "reasonable accommodations to the known
physical or mental limitations of an otherwise qualified individual with a
disability," absent an undue hardship to the employer.88 Thus, tinder the
ADA, employers have two primary obligations not to discriminate: they
cannot take an adverse action against an individual because of his or her
disability, and they must reasonably accommodate workers who have
disabilities.89 Moreover, employers cannot retaliate against individuals
based upon the exercise of their rights under the ADA.90
so42 U.S.C. § 12101 (a) (1)-(3).
81 Id. § 12101 (a) (7).
82 Id. § 12101(b) (1).
8- Id. § 12101(b) (2)-(3).
- 42 U.S.C.A. § 12111(5) (A) (West 2005 & Supp. 2009).
8 Id. § 12112(a). This operative language is the result of the recent amendments to
the ADA. The original provision prohibited discrimination "against a qualified individual
with a disability because of the disability of such individual." 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a).
8 42 U.S.C.A. § 12111(8).
87 Id. § 12112(a)-(b).
- Id. § 12112(b) (5).
89 Id. § 12112(a)-(b).
so Id. § 12203 ("No person shall discriminate against any individual because such indi-
vidual has opposed any act or practice made unlawful by this chapter or because such indi-
vidual made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in an investigation,
proceeding, or hearing under this chapter."). It should be noted that the retaliation provi-
sions of the ADA are found in Title V of the statue. Id.
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An employee is not protected by the ADA unless that individual is
considered disabled under the statute.9 1 The statute provides three dif-
ferent bases for coverage.92 First, an individual is covered by the statute
if that individual has "a physical or mental impairment that substan-
tially limits one or more of the major life activities of such individual."93
Second, an individual is protected if that individual has "a record of
such an impairment."94 Finally, an individual is considered disabled if
that individual is "regarded as having such an impairment" by the em-
ployer.9 5 Thus, the ADA provides coverage to individuals with actual
disabilities, to individuals with a record of a disability, and to those who
are regarded as disabled by their employers.96
2. Impact of the ADA
The ADA certainly has gone a long way towards eradicating dis-
crimination in the workplace on the basis of disability and in providing
relief to those who have suffered discrimination.97 Nonetheless, dis-
crimination in this area still exists and individuals continue to bring
thousands of charges of unlawful treatment on the basis of disability
each year.98 In 2008, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
("EEOC"), which enforces employment discrimination claims brought
tinder the ADA in the private sector,99 received 19,453 charges of dis-
ability discrimination.100 During the same fiscal year, the EEOC recov-
ered $57.2 million in monetary benefits for disability claims, an amount
exclusive of any "monetary benefits obtained through litigation."10
91 Id. § 12102(1).
92 42 U.S.C.A. § 12102(1).
93 Id.§ 12102(1)(A).
9 4 Id.§ 12102(1)(B).
- Id. § 12102(1)(C).
96 Id. § 12102(1). These categories are identical both before and after the statutory
amendments. Coimpare 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2) (2006), with 42 U.S.C.A. § 12102(1). The way
in which the categories are interpreted has changed significantly. See infra notes 107-169
and accompanying text (describing effect of recent amendments to the ADA).
9 See EEOC, ADA Charge Data--Monetary Benefits, FY 1997-FY 2008, http://www.
eeoc.gov/eeoc/statistics/enforcement/ada-monetary.cfm (last visited Dec. 1, 2009) (set-
ting forth monetary benefits recovered by EEOC for individuals with disabilities by various
categories).
98 Scc EEOC, Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA) Charges, FY1997-FY 2008,
http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/statistics/enforcement/ada-charges.cfm (last visited Dec. 1,
2009).
99 42 U.S.C.A. § 12117.
10 See ADA Charges, supra note 98. Between July 26, 1992, and the end of fiscal year
2008, the EEOC received a total of 272,652 charges of discrimination based on disability. Id.
101 Scc id.
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Despite the positive impact of the statute, the ADA was widely criti-
cized as not achieving its original purpose. 102 Some advocates described
the ADA simply as "a huge disappointment."1 03 The primary concern
over the effectiveness of the statute was the constricted reading of the
ADA by the courtS. 104 In particular, critics argued that the courts nar-
rowly interpreted the term "disability" under the ADA, thereby prohib-
iting many litigants from even qualifying for protection under the stat-
ute.105 This significant wave of criticism recently led to substantial
amendments of the statute.106
B. Amendments to the ADA
The ADA Amendments Act of 2008 ("ADAAA" or "amendments")
was signed into law by President George W Bush on September 25,
2008,107 and took effect on January 1, 2009.108 The amendments gained
unanimous support in the U.S. Senate, and also received support from
business organizations such as the U.S. Chamber of Commerce.109 The
amendments, which came after five years of deliberations on the is-
102 See, e.g., Katherine R. Annas, Note, Toyota Motor Manufacturing, Kentucky, Inc. v.
Williams: Part of an Emeiging Trend of Supreme Court Cases Narrowing the Scope of the ADA, 81
N.C. L. REv. 835, 835 (2003) (noting that the statute has "failed to fulfill its promise");
Sarah J. Parrot, Note, The ADA and Reasonable Acconmodation of Employes Regarded as Dis-
abled: Statutory Fact or BizarreFiction?, 67 Om1-o ST. L.J. 1495, 1496 (2006) ("[W]ith the judi-
cial opinions that soon issued [following the enactment of the ADA], both the drafters and
backers of Title I were alarmed because its provisions were not interpreted by the federal
judiciary as anticipated.").
103 Long, supra note 4, at 217.
104 See Craver, supra note 4, at 418 ("A series of recent Supreme Court decisions has
narrowed the scope of ADA coverage to severely limit statutory protection to individuals
with relatively severe disabilities."); Annas, supra note 102, at 835 ("Since its enactment, the
Supreme Court has begun to narrow the scope and coverage of the ADA."); Parrot, supra
note 102, at 1496-98 ("By the mid-1990s, disability rights scholars began to identify and
criticize the judiciary's 'backlash' against the ADA. . . . The results of empirical studies of
cases involving Title I indicated that ... the judiciary tended to interpret Title I in a nar-
rowing manner.").
105 See Craver, supra note 4, at 434-36 (discussing the Supreme Court's narrow defini-
tion of disability); Annas, supra note 102, at 835-36 (discussing narrowing of the disability
definition); Parrot, supra note 102, at 1497 ("The drafters and other commentators per-
ceived a movement within the judiciary to narrow the scope of the ADA, particularly in
regard to the fundamental issue of which individuals qualify as disabled and are thus enti-
tled to protection under the statute.").
106 See Long, supra note 4, at 217-18 (discussing recent amendments to ADA).
107 Press Release, U.S. Federal News, President Bush Signs S. 3406 into Law (Sept. 25,
2008); Long, supra note 4, at 217.
10 ADAAA, Pub. L. No. 110-325, § 8, 122 Stat. 3553, 3559 (2008).
10 David Savage, Job Discrimination Bill to Widen Who's Covered. L.A. TIMES, Sept. 22,
2008, at 13.
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sue,110 attempt to override a "series of Supreme Court rulings that
sharply limited who was covered by" the statute."1
The major purpose of the ADAAA is to "address some of the more
controversial and problematic aspects of the definition of disability."" 2
The text of the amendments states that Congress's expectation that the
term disability would be broadly interpreted "has not been fulfilled,"" 3
and that the Supreme Court has too narrowly construed the meaning
of the term in its decisions in 1999 in Sutton v. United Air Lines,"4 and in
2002 in Toyota Motor Manufacturing v. Williams."5 The amendments,
therefore, explicitly seek to "reinstat[e] a broad scope of protection"
under the statute.116 The ADAAA's most significant change is its "fairly
dramatic" alteration of the definition of who should be protected un-
der the statute." 7 Congress made clear in the amendments that the
disability definition "shall be construed in favor of broad coverage" up
to "the maximum extent permitted by the terms of this Act."" 8
1. Redefining Disability
In redefining the term "disability" under the ADA, Congress made
clear that the threshold question of whether an individual is disabled
tinder the statute "should not demand extensive analysis."" 9 Rather,
Congress sought to shift the focus from whether an individual is covered
by the statute to whether the employer has discriminated against an in-
dividual with a disability' 20 Thus, Congress plainly stated that the "pri-
mary object of attention in cases brought under the ADA should be
whether entities covered under the ADA have complied with their obli-
gations."121
The revisions to the statute leave the basic structure of the defini-
tion of disability intact.122 Thus, individuals are disabled if they have "a
110 David Savage, More Protection for Impaired Workers: Anti-Bias Bill Topples Restrictive
Court Rulings, CHI. TRIB., Sept. 24, 2008, at 12.
"I Id,
1" Long, supra note 4, at 218.
113 ADAAA § 2(a) (3).
114 See 527 U.S. 471, 482 (1999); see ADAAA § 2(a) (4).
115 Sce 534 U.S. 184, 197-98 (2002); see ADAAA § 2(a) (5).
16 ADAAA § 2(b)(1).
117 See Long, supra note 4, at 218.
118 AD.AAA § 4.
119 Id. § 2(b) (5).
120 See id.
121 Id. § 4(a).
122 Compare id. § 4, with 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2) (2006).
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physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more
major life activities;" have "a record of such an impairment;" or are "re-
garded as having such an impairment."'2 3 The language of the ADAA4
is largely identical to the original ADA when defining these three basic
categories of coverage.124 The ADAAA makes significant changes, how-
ever, to how these categories are interpreted. More specifically, the
ADA 4A provides guidance on what constitutes a major life activity, the
meaning of "substantially limited," the effect of using corrective meas-
ures, and the interpretation of the term "regarded as disabled." 25
2. What Is a Major Life Activity?
The ADA provides that an individual is disabled where that individ-
ual has a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits a major
life activity.'26 The ADA failed to define what constitutes a major life ac-
tivity,127 however, and left this task to the EEOC in its regulations. 28 Un-
fortunately, the lack of a clear definition for major life activities in the
ADA caused "a great deal of confusion," and resulted in a "myriad of
definitions and approaches advocated by the EEOC, the courts, and
commentators. "129
L3 ADAAA § 4(a).
124 See supra note 122.
125 ADAAA §§ 4-5.
126 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2) (A).
127 See generally Curtis Edmonds, Snakes and Ladders: Expanding the Definition of "Major
Life Activity" in the Americans with Disabilities Act. 33 TEx. TECH. L. REV. 321, 323 (2002)
("The ADA does not define the term 'major life activity.'"); Reagan S. Bissonette, Note,
Reasonably Accommodating Nonmitigating Plaintiffs Aftcr thc ADA Anendments of 2008, 50 B.C.
L. REv. 859, 863-64 (2009) (discussing the EEOC's regulations).
128 Sec 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(i) (2009) ("Major Life Activities means functions such as caring
for oneself, performing manual tasks, walking, seeing, hearing, speaking, breathing, learn-
ing, and working."); 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630 app. 1630.2(i) ("'Major life activities' are those ba-
sic activities that the average person in the general population can perform with little or
no difficulty. Major life activities include caring for oneself, performing manual tasks, walk-
ing, seeing, hearing, speaking, breathing, learning, and working. This list is not exhaustive.
For example, other major life activities include, but are not limited to, sitting, standing,
lifting, reaching."). Sec generally infra note 149 (noting notice of proposal rulemaking for
revisions to ADA regulations).
129 Wendy Hensel, Interacting with Others: A Major Life Activity Under the Americans with
Disabilities Act?, 2002 Wis. L. REV. 1139, 1148; accord Edmonds, supra note 127, at 374 ("The
chaotic process of separating major life activities from other activities is perhaps best seen
as a manifestation of the larger problem of how to define disability."); Lisa Eichhorn, Ma-
jor Litigation Activities Regarding Major Lifc Activities: The Failure of the "Disability "Definition in
the Ameincans with Disabilities Act of 1990. 77 N.C. L. REV. 1405, 1446-47 (1999) ("[P]ossible
variations in breadth continue to inject yet another element of uncertainty into the 'major
life activity' analysis.").
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The ADA2A helps clarify this confision, and provides a clear-
though not exhaustive-list of major life activities.130 The amendments
provide that "major life activities include, but are not limited to, caring
for oneself, performing manual tasks, seeing, hearing, eating, sleeping,
walking, standing, lifting, bending, speaking, breathing, learning, read-
ing, concentrating, thinking, communicating, and working."' 3'
The revised statute now largely adopts the activities set forth in the
EEOC regulations and appendix, and provides additional examples.'32
Moreover, the ADAAA also clarifies that "major bodily functions" consti-
tute major life activities under the ADA.13 3 These functions "includ [e]
but [are] not limited to, functions of the immune system, normal cell
growth, digestive, bowel, bladder, neurological, brain, respiratory, circu-
latory, endocrine, and reproductive functions." 3 4 These functions were
not previously enumerated as major life activities in the EEOC regula-
tions or appendix, and this clarification provides substantial guidance
on this issue.13 5
Perhaps the most significant major life activity identified by the
ADAM4 is "working." 36 Prior to the amendments, there was a substan-
tial question whether working should be considered a major life activity,
as the Supreme Court specifically left the question open in Sutton.137 In-
deed, the Court had even expressed its concerns over the "conceptual
difficulty" of accepting working as a major life activity. 38 The ADALA's
clear inclusion of working as a major life activity, combined with the
Iso ADAAA, Pub. L. No. 110-325, § 4(a), 122 Stat. 3553, 3555-56 (2008); Long, supra
note 4, at 222 ("Instead of offering an actual definition, the [revised] Act includes a non-
exhaustive list of major life activities as illustration.").
131 ADAAA § 4(a).
152 See 42 U.S.C.A. § 12102(2) (West 2005 & Supp. 2009); 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(i); id. at
pt. 1630 app. 1630.2(i). Sitting and reaching are identified as major life activities in the
appendix to the regulations, but do not appear in the ADAAA. ADAAA § 4(a); 29 C.F.R. pt.
1630 app. 1630.2(i). Similarly, the revised statute identifies eating, sleeping, bending, read-
ing, concentrating, thinking, and communicating as major life activities, which are not set
forth in the regulations or appendix. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 12102(2); 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(i); id.
at pt. 1630 app. 1630.2(i).
3 3 ADAAA § 4(a).
134 Id.
135 Sec 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(i); id. at pt. 1630 app. 1630.2(i); see also Eichhorn, supra note
129, at 1445 ("[I]t is unclear whether courts can allow physiological functions to qualify as
major life activities."); Long, supra note 4, at 223 (noting that after the ADAAA, "an impair-
ment that substantially limits nonvolitional bodily functions can qualify as a disability.").
136 ADAAA§ 4(a).
137 527 U.S. at 492 ("Because the parties accept that the term 'major life activities' in-
cludes working, we do not determine the validity of the cited regulations.").
138 Id. ("We note, however, that there may be some conceptual difficulty in defining
major life activities' to include work.").
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amendments' enumeration of other specific major life activities, should
help clarify the ambiguity that was present in the original statutory
scheme and case law.'13
3. Substantially Limited Under the ADAAA
The amendments make clear that one particular area of concern
was the Supreme Court's previous analysis of whether an individual is
substantially limited in performing a major life activity.140 The ADALA
expressly states that "the Supreme Court . . . interpreted the term 'sub-
stantially limits' to require a greater degree of limitation than was in-
tended by Congress." 141 Again, the statutory text of the ADA provided
little guidance on what constituted a substantial limitation,"42 and the
EEOC regulations and case law were left to fill in the void.143 The regu-
lations advised that one should look to the "nature and severity of the
impairment," the "duration or expected duration of the impairment,"
and the "permanent or long term impact, or the expected permanent
or long term impact of or resulting from the impairment." 44
Addressing the concern over the Supreme Court's interpretation
of substantial limitation, the ADAAA provides significant clarification as
to the meaning of this phrase in the statute. 45 The ADALA states that
the term "shall be interpreted consistently with the findings and pur-
poses of the ADA Amendments Act of 2008."146 The findings and pur-
poses reflect that Congress intends a broad reading of the phrase, and
rejects the narrow approach used by the Supreme Court.147 Congress
even rejected the EEOC's interpretation of "substantially limited" to
13 Scc ADAAA § 4 (a).
14 Id. § 2(a) (7).
141 Id.
142 Sec 42 U.S.C. § 12102 (2006).
143 See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j) (2009) (noting that "substantially limits" is defined as
"[u]nable to perform a major life activity that the average person in the general popula-
tion can perform" or "[s]ignificantly restricted as to the condition, manner or duration
tinder which an individual can perform a particular major life activity as compared to the
condition, manner, or duration under which the average person in the general population
can perform that same major life activity.").
144 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j).
145 ADAAA § 4(a); Long, supra note 4, at 219 ("[T]he new amendments expand the
meaning of the phrase 'substantially limits' in several ways.").
146 ADAAA § 4(a).
147 Id. § 2. For example, the ADAAA states, "the Supreme Court, in the case of Toyota
Motor Manufactiuing, Kentucky, Inc. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184 (2002), interpreted the term
'substantially limits' to require a greater degree of limitation than was intended by Con-
gress." ADAAA § 2(a) (7).
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mean "significantly restricted," 4 8 and directed the agency to amend its
regulations in accordance with the amendments. 149
In the ADAAA, Congress also provided more specifics as to what
substantially limits means, stating that "[a]n impairment that is episodic
or in remission is a disability if it would substantially limit a major life
activity when active."o50 Thus, if an individual has an impairment that is
not currently active, that individual may still be protected by the stat-
ute. 151 Congress further provided that an individual must have only a
single major life activity that is substantially limited to fall under the
statute's protection, as opposed to requiring multiple limitations.'52
4. Corrective Measures
Congress also addressed how an individual's corrective measures or
devices impact the "substantially limits" determination.153 The ADAAA
states that a court's analysis of "whether an impairment substantially lim-
its a major life activity" must be "made without regard to the ameliora-
tive effects of mitigating measures."1 54 This amendment to the ADA
overturns the Supreme Court's decision in Sutton, which held that that
"disability under the Act is to be determined with reference to corrective
measures. "155
148 ADAAA § 2(a) (8) ("Congress fids that the current Equal Employment Opportu-
nity Commission ADA regulations defining the term 'substantially limits' as 'significantly
restricted' are inconsistent with congressional intent, by expressing too high a standard.").
Sec 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j) (defining "substantially limits").
149 ADAAA § 2(b) (6) (stating that one of the purposes of this statute is "to express Con-
gress' expectation that the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission will revise that por-
tion of its current regulations that defines the term 'substantially limits' as 'significantly re-
stricted' to be consistent with this Act, including the amendments made by this Act"); accord
Long, supra note 4, at 219 ("Ultimately, Congress chose to punt and put the power to define
the term 'substantially limits' in the [EEOC's] hands."). On September 16, 2009, the EEOC
"voted to approve a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM) to conform its ADA regulations
to the Amendments Act of 2008. The NPRM was published in the Federal Register on Sep-
tember 23, 2009." EEOC, Notice Concerning the Americans With Disabilities Act (ADA)
Amendments Act of 2008, http://www.eeoc.gov/laws/statutes/adaaa-.notice.cfi (last visited
Jan. 19, 2010).
I50 ADAAA§ 4.
151 Id.; Long, supra note 4, at 221 (noting that the amendments create "new hope to
potential plaintiffs whose impairments are episodic in nature or in remission").
152 ADAAA § 4.
153 Id.
154 Id.
155 527 U.S. at 488. Congress was clear that one of the purposes of the amendments
was "to reject the requirement enunciated by the Supreme Court in Sutton ... and its
companion cases that whether an impairment substantially limits a major life activity is to
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More specifically, the AD.AA provides that the use of the following
should not be considered in the determination of whether an individual
is disabled under the statute: "medication, medical supplies, equipment,
or appliances, low-vision devices (which do not include ordinary eye-
glasses or contact lenses), prosthetics including limbs and devices, hear-
ing aids and cochlear implants or other implantable hearing devices,
mobility devices, or oxygen therapy equipment and supplies." 5 6
Congress also enumerated the utilization of "assistive technology"
"reasonable accommodations or auxiliary aids or services," and
"learned behavior or adaptive neurological modifications" as corrective
measures that should not impact an individual's protection tinder the
ADA.157 Thus, the amendments are clear that the courts should not
consider the use of almost any corrective measure or device in the de-
termination of whether an individual is disabled.'58 For example, an
individual who walks well with the use of a prosthetic leg may still be
disabled under the statute if that individual is substantially limited in
the ability to walk without the use of the prosthetic leg.
The ADAAA provides one notable exception to the general rule,
however, for the use of "ordinary eyeglasses or contact lenses."159 Thus, if
an individual is not substantially limited in seeing when wearing eye-
glasses, that individual will not be considered disabled tinder the stat-
ute.160 Interestingly, this exception involves the exact corrective devices at
issue in the Supreme Court's Sutton decision-eyeglasses and contacts.161
5. Regarded as Disabled
Through the ADAAA, Congress also significantly changed the
meaning of "regarded as disabled."162 Prior to the amendments, an indi-
be determined with reference to the ameliorative effects of mitigating measures." ADAAA
§ 2(b)(2). But see id. § 4 (providing exception for "ordinary eyeglasses or contact lenses").
156 ADAAA § 4.
157 Id.
158 Id.
159 Id. The amendments further define these devices, stating that "the term 'ordinary
eyeglasses or contact lenses' means lenses that are intended to fully correct visual acuity or
eliminate refractive error." Id.
160 Id. § 4. It is worth noting, however, that after the amendments, "if an employer uses
a qualification standard based on an individual's uncorrected vision, the employer must
show that the standard is job-related and consistent with business necessity." Long, supra
note 4, at 221 (citing ADAAA § 5(b)).
161 527 U.S. at 475 ("[W]e hold that the determination of whether an individual is dis-
abled should be made with reference to measures that mitigate the individual's impair-
ment, including, in this instance, eyeglasses and contact lenses."). Id.
162 ADAAA § 4.
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vidual could establish coverage under the ADA by demonstrating that
she was regarded as having an impairment that substantially limited a ma-
jor life activity.163 The ADAAA alters this definition by eliminating the re-
quirement that the employer must have perceived that the impairment
was substantially limiting.16 4 Thus, a plaintiff need only demonstrate
"that he or she has been subjected to an action prohibited under this
Act because of an actual or perceived physical or mental impairment
whether or not the impairment limits or is perceived to limit a major life activ-
ity."165 The amendments do not permit "regarded as" coverage for "tran-
sitory and minor" impairments, with "transitory" defined as an "im-
pairment with an actual or expected duration of 6 months or less." 6 6
The amendments also make clear that an employer need not ac-
commodate an individual who, is regarded as disabled.167 Thus, an em-
ployer "need not provide a reasonable accommodation" to an em-
ployee "who meets the definition of disability . .. solely under" the re-
garded-as definition.168 This statutory amendment resolved an existing
conflict in the courts over the breadth of the reasonable accommoda-
tion provision.169
III. AN ANALYSIS OF DISABILITY CLAIMS
The recent amendments to the ADAin favor of broad coverage
tinder the statute will require the federal courts to analyze disability
claims more closely. The complexity of the new provisions will make
this a difficult task for the courts, as evaluating disability claims was dif-
ficult long before the statutory amendments. Complicating matters fur-
ther, the Supreme Court's 2007 decision in Twombly v. Bell Atlantic Coip.
suggests that a more rigid approach may be appropriate when consider-
163 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2).
'6 ADAAA § 4; see Long, supra note 4, at 224 ("[A]n ADA plaintiff no longer faces the
difficult task of proving that a defendant's misperception of his or her condition was so severe
as to amount to a belief that the condition substantially limited a major life activity.").
165 ADAAA § 4 (emphasis added).
166 Id. The amendments do not define the term "minor." Id.; Long, supra note 4, at
224.
167 ADAAA § 6.
168 Id.
169 Scc, e.g., Lawrence Rosenthal, Reasonable Accommodations for Individuals Regarded as
Having Disabilities Under the Amihcans with Disabilitics Act? Why "No" Should Not Be thc Answe;
36 SETON HALL L. REv. 895, 897 (2006) ("It is clear that this issue has now created a split
among the United States Courts of Appeals, with four circuits agreeing that accommoda-
tions are required in cases involving plaintiffs regarded as disabled, four circuits believing
that accommodations are not required in such cases, and four circuits not having decided
the issue.") (citations omitted).
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ing employment discrimination claims.170 Thus, the lower courts are
receiving conflicting signals as to how strictly they should approach dis-
ability claims under the statute-Congress seems to be suggesting a
more liberal approach, while the Supreme Court is more restrictive.171
Before considering the appropriate standard for pleading disabil-
ity cases, it is useful to examine how the courts have treated disability
claims in the wake of Bell Atlantic.172 A recent study that I performed
reveals that some courts are undeniably using the Supreme Court's
plausibility standard to reject cases brought under Title VIJI.173 This
study did not examine the dismissal rates of disability cases following Bell
Atlantic, however, and there has been only limited analysis of the impact
of this decision on disability claims.174
Recently, I sought to fill this void in the academic scholarship by
conducting an analysis of disability cases in the year before and year af-
ter the Bell Atlantic decision. My goal in performing this additional study
was two-fold: First, I wanted to determine from a purely numeric stand-
point whether courts relying on the Bell Atlantic decision are dismissing
a higher percentage of disability cases than those courts that previously
relied on Conley v. Gibson; Second, I wanted to explore whether the
analysis used by the lower courts revealed that these courts were using
the Supreme Court's plausibility standard as a justification for dismissing
disability claims. This study does not attempt to measure absolute dis-
missal rates in the year before and year after Bell Atlantic, and does not
consider all motions to dismiss decided during this timeframe. Instead,
the analysis attempts to determine whether those courts in the study
that relied on Bell Atlantic were more likely to dismiss an ADA employ-
ment discrimination case than those courts that relied on Conley.175
170 See Seiner, supra note 54, at 1037 (noting that several district court decisions "clearly
illustrate that some district courts are not only applying the jlausibility standard to Title
VII claims, but that they are also raising the bar as to what an employment discrimination
plaintiff must plead in the case").
11 Compare ADAAA, Pub. L. No. 110-325, 122 Stat. 3553, 3553-59 (2008), with Bell At-
lantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007).
172 See infma notes 176-192 and accompanying text.
173 Seiner, supra note 54, at 1029-34. Another study suggests that a higher percentage
of civil rights claims were being dismissed after Bell Atlantic. Hannon, supra note 54, at
1815. A third study suggests a higher percentage of Title VII dismissals following Bell Atlan-
tic. See Hatamyar, supra note 17, at 38.
174 See Hatamyar, supra note 17, at 35-39 (performing empirical analysis of impact of
Iqbal and Bell Atlantic on various claim types); Seiner, supra note 54; infra notes 176-192
and accompanying text.
175 See generally Seiner, supra note 54 (performing similar analysis in Title VII context);
Hannon, supra note 54 (performing empirical analysis following Bell Atlantic decision).
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A. Methodology
For this study, I examined 478 federal district court decisions, bro-
ken down into two different groups of opinions. 7 6 I constructed two
searches in the Westlaw federal district court database designed to re-
veal the most relevant decisions involving a motion to dismiss brought
pursuant to the ADA in the year before and following Bell Atlantic.'"
Though not necessarily exhaustive, the searches were broad and de-
signed to be very inclusive.
For the first search, I examined those decisions involving a motion
to dismiss a claim brought under Title I of the ADA (which prohibits
employment discrimination)178 or an employment-related retaliation
claim brought under Title V of the ADA,' 79 in the year before Bell Atlan-
tic that cited the Supreme Court's Conley decision.180 This search re-
vealed a data set of 233 decisions.181 Because the search terms used
were extremely broad, an analysis of each of these decisions revealed
fifty-nine relevant opinions.' 82 The remaining decisions were excluded
from the study for a variety of reasons, including that they were not
brought under Title I or V of the ADA,183 or that they involved a claim
brought under a statute other than the ADA.184
176 See ADA Search Results (on file with author). The search results discussed in this
Article were correct as of the completion of the study on December 4, 2008. However,
"Westlaw does occasionally add cases to its database for various reasons." Joseph A. Seiner,
The Failure of Punitive Damages in Employment Discimination Cases: A Call for Change, 50 WM.
& MARY L. REv. 735, 757 n.134 (2008).'
177 The search focused on motionsito dismiss brought under FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).
A decision was not necessarily excluded from the study, however, if the motion to dismiss
in the opinion was brought pursuant to a different provision of the rules. To the extent
that a particular case involved multiple motions to dismiss that resulted in more than one
opinion during the time-frame of the study, each opinion was treated as a separate result.
Similarly, to the extent that multiple motions to dismiss were addressed by a court in a
single opinion, they were analyzed as a single motion as part of this study. See ADA Search
Results, supra note 176.
178 See 42 U.S.C. §§ 12111-12117 (2006).
r7 See id. § 12203.
18 The exact search used was "(Conley) /250 ("failure to state a claim" "12(b)(6)") /250
("Americans with Disabilities Act" "ADA" "disability") & DA(after 5/14/2006) & DA(before
5/15/2007)". A week lag time was also included between the ending date for this data set of
May 14, 2007, and the Bell Atlantic decision, which was issued on May 21, 2007.
181 See ADA Search Results, supra note 176.
182 See id.
183 It was often not clear from the face of the decision which title(s) the claim was
brought under, though most employment discrimination claims would typically proceed
under Title I or Title V. Cf Osborne v. Okla. Employment Sec. Comm'n., 2006 WL
2090089, at *3 (W.D. Okla. July 25, 2006) ("The courts are divided on whether a state em-
ployee may sue under Title II for employment discrimination when Title I expressly gov-
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For the second search, I examined those decisions involving a mo-
tion to dismiss a claim brought pursuant to Title I of the ADA, or an
employment-related retaliation claim brought tinder Title V of the
ADA, in the year following Bell Atlantic that cited the Supreme Court's
Bell Atlantic decision.1 35 The one-year time frame considered began sev-
eral days after the Supreme Court decision was issued, to give the dis-
trict courts time to interpret and apply the decision. 86 This second
search revealed 245 decisions, about the same number of opinions as
the first search.' 87 For the reasons discussed above, an analysis of each
of these decisions revealed only sixty-five relevant opinions, creating a
similar size data set.18
The similar data sets of the two searches makes the study appropri-
ate for comparative purposes. I therefore examined each of the rele-
vant decisions and categorized the opinions in one of three ways: 1)
whether the decision granted a motion to dismiss the ADA claims in
whole; 2) whether the decision granted a motion to dismiss the ADA
claims in part; or 3) whether the decision denied in whole a motion to
dismiss the ADA claims.' 89 In cataloguing each opinion, I also identified
the citation of each decision, the jurisdiction from which the case
arose, and whether the plaintiff in the case was proceeding pro se or
with representation.o90
B. Study Results
The study set forth in this Article analyzes the impact of the Bell
Atlantic decision on motions to dismiss in the disability discrimination
context. The analysis of 1) those ADA decisions issued the year prior to
Bell Atlantic that relied on the Conley case, and 2) those decisions issued
erns such conduct."). Thus, categorizing the decisions was somewhat of a subjective proc-
ess in this regard.
184 See, c.g., Holloway A. Corr. Med. Servs., 2007 WL 1445701, at *1 (E.D. Mo. May 11,
2007) (case brought pursuant to Title II of the ADA and not considered a relevant deci-
sion to the study); Burritt v. Potter, 2007 WL 1394136, at *1 (D. Conn. May 10, 2007) (case
brought pursuant to the Rehabilitation Act and not considered a relevant decision to the
study).
185 The exact search used was "(Twombly) /250 ("failure to state a claim" "12(b)(6)")
/250 ("Americans with Disabilities Act" "ADA" "disability") & DA(after 5/31/2007) &
DA(before 6/1/2008)".
186 See supra notes 180, 185. The Bc/lAt/antic decision n's issued by the Supreme Court
on May 21, 2007. 550 U.S. at 544.
187 See ADA Search Results, supra note 176.
188 See id.
189 See id.
198 See id.
2010] 117
HeinOnline  -- 51 B.C. L. Rev. 117 2010
Boston College Law Review
the year following Bell Atlantic that relied on the new Supreme Court
decision revealed the results set forth in the table below:191
Table 1: Results of Disability Study
% of Motions% of Motions % of Motions % of Motions
Granted an tEed Granted orGranted Granted-in-Part DeniedGranted-i-n-Part
Pre-BellAtlantic Opinions 54.2% 10.2% 64.4% 35.6%
(59 Total) 32 opinions 6 opinions 38 opinions 21 opinions
Post-BellAtlantic Opinions 64.6% 13.8% 78.5% 21.5%
(65 Total) 42 opinions 9 opinions 51 opinions 14 opinions
The study revealed a higher percentage of district court opinions
granting motions to dismiss in the disability context in the year follow-
ing the Bell Atlantic decision compared to the year prior. Of the pre-Bell
Atlantic decisions analyzed that cited Conley, the motions to dismiss were
granted 54.2% of the time, and 64.4% of the motions to dismiss were at
least partially granted. Comparatively, in the year following Bell Atlantic,
64.6% of the motions to dismiss were granted, while 78.5% of the mo-
tions were at least partially granted, when the courts cited the new Su-
preme Court decision. 92
C. #udy Limitations
The study provides meaningful data on the impact of the Bell At-
lantic decision on motions to dismiss brought in the disability discrimi-
nation context. Before drawing any conclusions from the study, how-
ever, it is important to consider the possible limitations of the research.
Initially, given the limited number of ADA decisions addressing mo-
tions to dismiss in the employment discrimination context, the result-
ing data sets of the pre- and post-Bell Atlantic district court opinions
were both quite small. 93 From a purely numerical standpoint, the lim-
ited number of cases makes it difficult to draw any substantial conclu-
sions regarding the resulting differentials between the two data sets.
For example, the 14.1% differential between those disability decisions
that at least partially granted a motion to dismiss in the pre- and post-
191 The results set forth in the table were compiled from the disability study discussed
in this Article. See id.
1 Sec id.
19 SecADA Search Results, supra note 176.
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Bell Atlantic opinions does not fise to a level of statistical significance.94
Therefore, as more decisions are issued, further study on the impact of
the Bell Atlantic decision on motions to dismiss in the disability context
will be necessary.
Additionally, there may be some concern over possible publication
bias from the study, as the research conducted for this Article examines
only those decisions that are published in the Westlaw database and
does not review any unpublished opinions which do not appear in this
database. Although the study does focus exclusively on these published
cases, this is equally true of both data sets that are being compared in
this Article (i.e. the pre- and post-Bell Atlantic decisions), which greatly
limits the likelihood of achieving skewed results. Thus, "the fact that
any 'reported case bias' is equally present in both the pre- and post-[Bell
Atlantic] case set allows for a meaningful comparison and analysis of
any change. "195
Moreover, it is worth noting that while extremely broad, the
searches constructed for this study do not necessarily identify every
possible relevant case on this issue. A broader search could have been
constructed that may have identified additional applicable decisions.
The study conducted here was not intended to be exhaustive, however,
and the searches were constructed to provide the most relevant deci-
sions in the disability discrimination context both before and after the
Bell Atlantic decision. Even with the searches utilized in this study, only
about a quarter of the decisions analyzed (124 out of 478) proved to be
on point, and an even broader search would likely have identified an
even higher percentage of irrelevant opinions.196 And, as already dis-
cussed, the purpose of the study was not to measure absolute dismissal
rates in the year before and after Bell Atlantic.97 Instead, the analysis
attempts to determine whether those courts in the study that relied on
194 The Fisher's Exact Test function of the FREQ procedure of SAS version 9.1 software
(SAS Institute, Inc., Cary, NC, USA) was used to estimate probabilities of obtaining the
observed differences in frequencies by chance alone. I would like to thank Timothy Mous-
seau for providing the statistical computations set forth in this Article. See Statistical Analy-
sis ofADA Search Results (on file with author).
1 Seiner, supra note 54, at 1031 (quoting Hannon, supra note 54, at 1829).
196 The study performed could have gone back further in time in analyzing the pre-Bcll
Atlantic cases. I chose not to do so, however, for two reasons. First, the one-year time frame of
the two searches provided a very similar size data set for comparative purposes. Second, by
examining those decisions in the year most recent to the Bell Atlantic decision, we are able to
see the trends in the cases immediately prior to the Supreme Court decision. Sce id. at 1027-
31 (discussing methodology of similar study performed for Title VII discrimination cases);
Hannon, supra note 54, at 1830-31 (discussing Bell Atlantic empirical analysis).
19 Seiner, supra note 54, at 1031-32.
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Bell Atlantic were more likely to dismiss an ADA employment discrimi-
nation case than those courts that relied on Conley.'"
Finally, it should be considered that this study was conducted be-
fore the Supreme Court's recent ruling in 2009 in Ashcroft v. Iqbal.199 It
is still too early to undertake any substantive analysis of how the lower
courts have treated the Iqbal decision. Though Iqbal largely confirms
the Bell Atlantic plausibility standard,200 additional research in this area
will prove valuable as the courts grapple with both decisions, and con-
tinue to define the plausibility standard.
D. Conclusions from the Study
Irrespective of the limitations of the study discussed above, the
data uncovered here are useful for examining the significance of the
new plausibility standard announced by the Supreme Court on ADA
cases. There are two different sets of information to consider: First, the
purely numerical results of the study, and what impact-if any-Bell
Atlantic has had on the percentage of decisions that dismiss disability
claims:201 Second, the reasoning of the opinions themselves. 202 An indi-
vidual review of the cases in this study will help determine the extent to
which the district courts are relying on the new plausibility standard to
justify the dismissal of disability claims. 203 Although the numerical data
are important, an individual case review helps bring this data to life.
1. Numerical Results
The numerical results from the study set forth in the table above
are straightforward. The study reveals a higher percentage of district
court opinions granting motions to dismiss in the disability context in
the year following the Bell Atlantic decision compared to the year prior
to the Supreme Court case. 204 In the pre-Bell Atlantic opinions that rely
on Conly, 54.2% of the motions to dismiss were granted, and 64.4% of
the motions were at least partially granted.205 In the year following Bell
Atlantic, however, 64.6% of the motions to dismiss were granted and
198 See id. at 1031.
199 See generally 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009).
200 See id. at 1949-54.
201 Sec infra notes 204-209 and accompanying text.
202 Sec infra notes 210-242 and accompanying text.
203 Sec infra notes 210-242 and accompanying text.
2o4 See supra notes 191--192 and accompanying text.
*0 Sec ADA Search Results, supra note 176.
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78.5% of the motions were at least partially granted, when the courts
cited the new Supreme Court decision.20o The 14.1% differential be-
tween those disability decisions that at least partially granted a motion
to dismiss in the pre- and post-Bell Atlantic opinions reflects the greater
likelihood that a court relying on the Bell Atlantic decision will ulti-
mately reject a disability allegation. 207
To be sure, given the limited time-frame of the study and the result-
ing small number of cases in the data set, additional research on this
issue is necessary as more time passes and additional decisions are is-
sited. Nonetheless, the study's results are revealing and consistent with
other research in this area: a prior analysis of civil rights claims (outside
of the disability context) suggests that Bell Atlantic is having an impact on
these claims. 208 Similarly, my prior study of the impact of Bell Atlantic on
employment discrimination cases revealed that district courts relying on
this Supreme Court decision are granting a higher percentage of mo-
tions to dismiss brought in the Title VII context than those courts that
had previously relied on Conley.209 The results set forth in this study are
therefore not surprising. A closer examination, however, of the individ-
nal cases is necessary to determine the extent to which the lower courts
are using the plausibility standard to reject disability claims.
2. Individual Examination of Case Law
Although the numerical results set forth above shed light on the
impact of Bell Atlantic, an individual examination of the cases in the
study helps reveal the true significance of the decision. The numbers
uncovered from the study are concrete, while an individual case review
of the impact of the Bell Atlantic decision is much more subjective.
Nonetheless, the review of these decisions resulted in one seemingly
concrete conclusion: the courts are confused as to how to analyze dis-
ability claims.
Initially, it should be noted that until recently there was a signifi-
cant question as to whether Bell Atlantic-which arose as a complex an-
titrust case-should apply outside of the antitrust context.210 In Iqbal,
206 See id.
207 As previously noted, however, this differential does not rise to the level of statistical
significance. Scc supra notes 193-200 and accompanying text.
208 Hannon, supra note 54, at 1815, 1837 tbl. 3 and accompanying text.
209 Seiner, supra note 54, at 1030, 1031.
210 Cf Hannon, supra note 54, at 1814-15 ("[W]hile some commentators have sug-
gested that [Bell Atlantic] will only apply in the antitrust context, this study shows that
courts have applied the decision in every substantive area of law governed by Rule 8.").
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however, the Supreme Court clarified that the plausibility standard
should apply to all civil causes of action. 211 Even before Iqbal, the lower
courts were applying the Bell Atlantic standard to the disability context,
as district courts in almost every federal circuit cited the case in disabil-
ity-related opinions during the time-frame of this study.212 Relying on
Bell Atlantic to resolve motions to dismiss brought in the disability con-
text, district courts have stated that the complaint must "set forth suffi-
cient facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face,"213 indi-
cated that the complaint should "contain sufficient factual allegations
to raise a right to relief above the speculative level,"214 and noted that
the Bell Atlantic decision "prescribed a new inquiry to use in reviewing a
dismissal. "215 The reach of Bell Atlantic is thus much broader than the
complex antitrust context and extends to disability cases as well.
My previous study of Title VII cases revealed that the lower courts
were using the new standard set forth in Bell Atlantic to raise the plead-
ing bar and reject employment discrimination claims. 216 The same can-
not be said for my analysis of disability claims, however. Indeed, the
courts, by and large, have not relied on the plausibility standard to dis-
card claims brought pursuant to the ADA. Rather, there is much more
confusion and uncertainty in the disability context as to how the plau-
sibility standard should be applied.217 The amount of weight given to
the Bell Atlantic test tends to vary significantly with the particular court,
leaving the pleading standards in disarray for this area of the law.218 For
example, in 2007, in Gannon v. Continuum Health Partners, the U.S. Dis-
211 129 S. Ct. at 1953.
21 See, e.g., Adkins v. Fairfax County Sch. Bd., 2008 WL 2076654, at *2 (E.D. Va. May
15, 2008); Elias v. Randstad Work Solutions, 2008 WL 2036824, at *1 (W.D. Tex. May 9,
2008); Lyons v. Commonwealth Edison, 2008 WL 4686153, at *2 (N.D. Ill. May 5, 2008);
Cannady v. First Co., 2008 WiL 1901197, at *2 (W.D. Mo. Apr. 25, 2008); Wyckoff v. Love-
land Chrysler-Plymouth, 2008 WL 927664, at *1 (D. Colo. Apr. 3, 2008); Sykes v. Potter,
2008 WL 731394, at *2 (S.D. Ohio Mar. 17, 2008); Roberts v. Fulton, 2008 WL 542680, at
*2 (N.D. Ga. Feb. 22, 2008); Lee v. Sony BMG Music Entm't, 557 F. Supp. 2d 418, 424
(S.D.N.Y 2008); Lorah v. Tetra Tech., 541 F. Supp. 2d 629, 633 (D. Del. 2008); Manson v.
Low Income Hous. Inst., 2007 WI. 3129590, at *1 (W.D. Wash. Oct. 23, 2007); Spelke v.
Gonzalez, 516 F. Supp. 2d 76, 79 (D.D.C. 2007).
2s Smith v. Cmty. Coll., 2007 WL 2683831, at *3 (W.D. Pa. Sept. 7, 2007) (adopting
magistrate recommendation as opinionlof the court).
2 14 Wright v. City of Trenton, 2007 WiL 2705162, at *1 (D.NJ. Sept. 17, 2007).
215 Cox v. Kemptom Co.. 2008 WH. 111328, at *1 (W.D. Okla.Jan. 8, 2008).
216 See Seiner, supra note 54, at 1014 ("[A]n individual examination of the decisions ...
revealed that the lower courts are unquestionably using the new plausibility standard to
dismiss Title VII claims.").
217 See infra notes 217-242 and accompanying text.
21 See infra notes 217-242 and accompanying text.
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trict Court for the Southern District of New York granted a defendant's
motion to dismiss the plaintiffs disability claim and noted that "the
United States Supreme Court in Bell Atlantic . . . elevated the standard
for pleading a claim."219 The U.S. District Court for the Eastern District
of New York, however, also citing to Bell Atlantic, declared less than a
month earlier that "there is no heightened pleading requirement for
suits alleging discrimination. "220
This stark contrast is further evident in two district court cases
from 2007: Taggart v. Moody's Investors Service2 1 and Cox v. True North
Eneig. 222 In Taggart, a pro se plaintiff alleged that her former employer
had discriminated against her because of her disability, and she further
alleged constructive discharge in violation of the ADA. 223 In addressing
the employer's motion to dismiss, the U.S. District Court for the South-
ern District of New York was troubled by the plaintiffs "unclear" plead-
ings as to her alleged disability. 22 4 Though the plaintiffs complaint ref-
erenced that she suffered from several impairments, the court held that
she had failed to sufficiently allege a "disability"under the statute:
Plaintiff repeatedly refers to her "undiagnosed maladies," in-
cluding numerous illness[es] following a laparoscopy in 1993,
a "sudden abdominal crisis" which involved plaintiff's taking
various antibiotics, a suppository plaintiff alleges was inserted
by doctors into her uterus, a "deliberate needle injury" and a
parasite infection that plaintiff alleges [was] so "severely crip-
pling both physically and mentally ["] . . . The descriptions of
the undiagnosed maladies, however, are not sufficient to
2 2007 IWL 2040579, at *2 (S.D.N.YJulv 12, 2007). The district court went on to note
the more relaxed standard of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit announced
in that circuit's Iqbal decision: "In a post-Belt decision, the United States Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit interpreting Bell stated, '[T]he [Supreme] Court is not requiring a
universal standard of heightened fact pleading, but is instead requiring a flexible "plausi-
bility standard," which obliges a pleader to amplify a claim with some factual allegation in
those contexts where such amplification is needed to render the claim plausible.'" Id. (ci-
tation omitted). It is worth noting, however, that the outcome of the Gannon case did not
seem to turn on the plausibility standard. See id. at *3-*5. Moreover, the Second Circuit's
decision in Iqbal was subsequently overturned by the Supreme Court. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at
1942-43.
220 Sierotowicz v. N.Y State Div. of Hous., 2007 WL 1825402, at *1, *2 (E.D.N.Y June
21, 2007). The Sierotowicz case did arise outside of the disability discrimination context,
however, and involved discrimination in housing. Id. at *1-*3.
221 2007 WL 2076980, at "1 (S.D.N.YJuly 17, 2007).
222 524 F. Supp. 2d 927 (N.D. Ohio 2007).
223 2007 WL 2076980, at *'7.
224 Id.
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permit this Court to conclude that plaintiff has alleged a dis-
ability within the meaning of the ADA.225
The district court was equally unimpressed with the plaintiffs alle-
gations that she suffered from Lyrne disease, as the plaintiff had failed to
allege how the disease impaired her work performance or how it sub-
stantially limited a major life activity.2 26 In rejecting the complaint, the
district court relied on the standard set forth by the Supreme Court in
Bell Atlantic, holding that the allegations were "bereft of 'facts to state a
claim to relief that is plausible on its face."' 227 Though the complaint may
have been dismissed appropriately on other grounds,228 this rigid appli-
cation of the plausibility standard to the disability context is alarming. To
say that a "sudden abdominal crisis," a crippling parasite infection, and
Lyme disease fail to plausibly allege a disability under the ADA certainly
pushes the plausibility standard to the most restrictive possible limit.229
In Cox, however, we see the U.S. District Court for the Northern
District of Ohio take the complete opposite approach from the court in
Taggart. The plaintiff in Cox argued that her employer had improperly
terminated her because she suffered from kidney cancer, and that her
employer also failed to provide her with reasonable accommodations in
violation of the statute. 230 Similar to the defendant in Taggart, the com-
pany in this case maintained that the plaintiff had failed to show that
she was "disabled" under the ADA. 231 The Cox court was not persuaded
by the defendant's argument, holding that the plaintiff had sufficiently
alleged a disability at the motion to dismiss stage of the pleadings.2 32
Thus, the court noted that the defendant had placed the "summary
judgment 'cart' before the Rule 12(b) (6) motion to dismiss 'horse'.
Whether Cox is and was legally 'disabled' under the anti-disability dis-
crimnination statutes is a fact-based inquiry and determination that 'is
not generally motion to dismiss territory.'"233
225 Id. (citations omitted).
226 Id. at *8.
227 Id. (citing BellAtlantic, 550 U.S. at 555).
228 Sec id. at *17-*8. For example, there seems to be some question as to whether the
defendant knew of some of the plaintiff's impairments, though it is not entirely clear that
this alone would warrant dismissal of the case, as the defendant does appear to have had
knowledge of the plaintiffs diagnosis of Lyme disease. Id.
229 Sec 2007 WL 2076980, at *7-*8.
230 524 F. Supp. 2d at 943.
231 Id. at 944.
232 Id.
233 Id. (citation omitted).
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Therefore, the plaintiffs allegations that she suffered from cancer
that substantially limited her ability to work (as well as other major life
activities) at the time of her termination, and her assertion that the de-
fendant denied a leave request for medical treatment, were sufficient to
allege disability discrimination under the ADA.234 In its decision, the
court also highlighted the Bell Atlantic plausibility test, and emphasized
the "uncertainty" that the decision left over the proper pleading stan-
dard. 235 The district court found the exact pleading standard irrelevant
to this case, however, as the matter did not turn on the "nuances" of Bell
Atlantic.23 6 Nonetheless, referencing this standard, the court concluded
that it was "plausible under the facts as alleged that [the plaintiff] was
disabled. "237 Thus, the Cox decision demonstrates a district court unwill-
ing to rigidly apply Bell Atlantic to the disability context, holding that
fact intensive questions are best left for summaryjudgment.238
Finally, the confusion in the area of disability litigation is perhaps
best seen in the 2007 case, Parmenter v. Wal-Mart Stores.239 In Parmente;
the U.S. District Court for the District of Connecticut noted the uncer-
tainty over the proper pleading standard in "cases outside of the anti-
trust context," indicating that the issue "has already begun to generate
discussion in the courts." 240 Rather than weighing in on the proper
pleading standard, however, the court simply avoided the issue alto-
gether, holding that the plaintiff's complaint under the ADA, "where
deficient, is equally so under the Rule 12(b) (6) pleading regime in ef-
fect prior to Bell Atlantic."24' The decision of the Parmenter court under-
scores the difficulty left in analyzing claims after the Supreme Court's
decision in Bell Atlantic. The pleading standards should be transparent
to both the courts and the litigants, and a U.S. district court should
never need to avoid determining the proper standard to apply in a dis-
ability case.
Consistent with other areas of civil rights law, courts are granting a
higher percentage of motions to dismiss in the disability context after
234 Id. at 944-45.
23 Id. at 934 n.2.
236 Cox, 524 F. Supp 2d at 934 n.2.
23 Id. at 945 (emphasis added).
238 Id. at 944.
23 2007 WL 2071625, at *1 (D. Conn.July 16, 2007).
240 Id. at *3 n.
241 Id.
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Bell Atlantic when those courts irely on this new decision. 242 Unlike Title
VII claims, however, courts d6 not appear to be using the Bell Atlantic
plausibility standard to rigidly dismiss cases brought under the ADA.
Rather, a closer analysis of the decisions reveals confusion in the courts
over the proper pleading standard to apply, and conflict over the level
of specificity needed to allege a disability claim. The Taggart, Cox, and
Parmenter decisions clearly illustrate the lack of direction on disability
pleading in the district courts, as these courts are inconsistent in their
application of Bell Atlantic to disability claims. Unfortunately, this confu-
sion will only intensify as courts begin to grapple with the ADAAA and
how these amendments impact the pleading of a disability case. Plain-
tiffs and courts need a clear pleading standard now, before the uncer-
tainty grows any further.
3. U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit's Decision in EEOC v.
Lee's Log Cabin
Mirroring the confusion in the district courts over the proper
pleading standard for, disability claims after Bell Atlantic, a recent fed-
eral appellate decision. further demonstrates the judiciary's uncertainty
when attempting to analyze such cases. In EEOC v. Lee's Log Cabin, the
EEOC stied the defendant on behalf of Korrin Krause Stewart, who was
born HIV positive and developed AIDS early in her life.2 4 3 After apply-
ing for ajob as a waitress with the defendant, Stewart did not hear from
the restaurant, and she later returned and asked if she could revise her
application.244 Stewart then noticed that "HIV+" was written on the top
of her application; the assistant manager acknowledged making this
notation and indicated that he had learned of her impairment in the
local newspaper.245 The restaurant did not hire Stewart for the position,
maintaining that her lifting restrictions and inexperience as a waitress
made her inappropriate for the job.246
The EEOC sued the restaurant and asserted that the defendant had
failed to comply with the ADA when it decided not to hire Stewart.247
The EEOC alleged that the decision not to hire Stewart was made by the
42 Hatamyar, supra note 17, at 35-38 (discussing various types of cases); Seiner, supra
note 54, at 23 tbl. B (discussing Title VII cases); Hannon, supra note 54, at 1837 tbl. 3 (dis-
CUssing civil rights cases).
2 43 546 F.3d 438, 440 (7th Cir. 2008), reh' denicd 554 F.3d 1102 (7th Cir. 2009).
4 Id. at 440-41.
2 Id. at 441.
24 Id.
247 Id.
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restaurant "because it learned that she was HIV positive." 248 No mention
was made in the complaint of Stewart's AIDS status, and the EEOC did
not raise this condition until responding to the employer's motion for
summary judgment.249 In response to this motion, the EEOC filed
documents establishing that Stewart's activities were impaired as a result
of her suffering from AIDS.250 The district court criticized the EEOC for
its late efforts to "shift the factual basis of the claim" from HIV to AIDS,
which represented a "gross departure from what [the EEOC] alleged in
the initial stages of this lawsuit."25' The district court rejected the docu-
ments the EEOC submitted outlining Stewart's limitations, "because
HIV and AIDS are not synonymous for purposes of the ADA."252 With-
out any evidence as to Stewart's limitations, the court determined that
the EEOC had not shown that Stewart's HIV satisfied the definition of
disability under the ADA, and granted judgment in favor of the em-
ployer.253
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the
district court opinion in 2008 in a split decision.254 Citing Bell Atlantic,
the majority emphasized the importance of providing sufficient notice
to the defendant of the allegations in the case.255 The court found that
the EEOC's complaint setting forth Stewart's HIV status was distinct
from an allegation that she also suffered from AIDS, and questioned
why the EEOC waited so long to "disclose that Stewart had AIDS and
that this was the actual basis for the discrimination alleged."256 The
court found that the district court was within its discretion to reject the
EEOC's documents setting forth the impact of AIDS on Stewart's activi-
ties, and that the record was therefore "silent about the effect of HIV"
on Stewart.257 This silence "necessarily" leads to the determination that
248 Id.
249 Lee's Log Cabin. 546 F.3d at 441.
2o Id.
251 Id.
252 Id.
253 Id. The court also concluded that "there was no evidence" that the restaurant "knew
Stewart suffered from AIDS," and found it "questionable" as to "whether Stewart was a
qualified individual' under the ADA." Id.
254 Id. at 446.
255 Lee's Log Cabin, 546 F.3d at 443.
256 Id.
257 Id. Interestingly, the EEOC's response to the defendant's summary judgment mo-
tion included documents which "in some instances" explained how Stewart's "HIV/AIDS"
status "affected Stewart's life activities." Id. at 441. Thus, the EEOC's documentation on
Stewart's limitations seems to have been broader than only showing how AIDS impaired
her abilities-it also focused (at least somewhat) on her HIV status. Id.
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the EEOC failed to show that Stewart was an individual with a disability
under the ADA.258
In her dissent, Judge Williams criticized the distinction that was
made by the district court and the majority between HIV and AIDS,
noting that "[a] person diagnosed with AIDS is also HIV positive." 25 9
Moreover, the "distinction improperly focus[es] on the name of Stew-
art's disability rather than its effects on her life activities." 260 Emphasiz-
ing that the two conditions should not be separated as part of an analy-
sis under the ADA, Judge Williams stated:
[H]aving AIDS is not inconsistent with being HIV positive,
nor is it a new "cause of action" under the ADA. . . . [T]he al-
legation in the complaint that Stewart was "HIV positive" is
consistent with the fact that she has AIDS. It follows that the
evidence regarding the impact that "HIV/AIDS" or AIDS has
on Stewart's life activities 'describes the impact that HIV has
on Stewart's life activities. 261
Judge Williams therefore disagreed with the majority, concluding that
Stewart had sufficiently set forth a disability under the ADA. 262
Even at the federal appellate level, we see disagreement over what
must be alleged in a complaint to state a claim under the ADA. The ma-
jority in Lee's Log Cabin found that the EEOC's failure to allege that the
defendant had AIDS-instead of setting forth HIV as the impairment-
was fatal to the Commission's case. 263 The dissent, however, took a
broader approach to the pleading requirements, concluding that the
district court's HIV/AIDS distinction was "erroneous and therefore un-
reasonable."2 64 Though a strong argument can be made for either ap-
258 Id. at 444. The majority further concluded that "Stewart was not a qualified individ-
ual under the ADA, and for this additional reason, summaryjudgment [for the restaurant]
was appropriate." Id. at 445-46 (emphasis added).
25 Id. at 446 (Williams,J., dissenting).
"6 Id.
261 Lee's Log Cabin, 546 F.3d at 447.
262 Id. at 448 ("Because the EEOC presented evidence demonstrating that Stewart's dis-
ease-regardless of whether her disease is called 'HIV,' 'HIV/AIDS' or 'AIDS'-substantially
limits one or more of Stewart's major life activities, it met its burden of demonstrating that
Stewart is 'disabled' for purposes of the ADA."). Judge Williams further disagreed with the
majority on the question of whether Stewart was a qualified individual with a disability. Id. at
449.
26- Id. at 443-45 (majority opinion).
264 Id. at 446 (Williams, J., dissenting). In a dissent from the denial of rehearing en
banc in this case, Judge Williams-joined by three other judges-stated that the majority's
decision was "inconsistent with our case law regarding general notice pleading standards."
EEOC v. Lee's Log Cabin, 554 F.3d 1102, 1105 (WilliamsJ., dissenting).
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proach, the confusion and inconsistency over the specificity with which a
complaint must be alleged leads to significant difficulty in properly
pleading an ADA claim. And, at least in this case, the result of that confu-
sion had very unfortunate consequences. 265 Whether a litigant alleges
discrimination because she suffers from HIV or AIDS, that individual
should be entitled to pursue relief under the clear purpose and mandate
of the statue.266 A clear and concise pleading standard should therefore
be established to resolve this confusion, and to assure that other indi-
viduals with disabilities do not slip through the cracks of the complaint.
IV. A NEW PROPOSAL FOR PLEADING DISABILITY
The data set forth in this Article establish a higher percentage of
district court opinions granting motions to dismiss in the disability con-
text in the year following Twonbly v. Bell Atlantic Cop. when the courts
cite to that decision compared to the year prior to Bell Atlantic when the
courts cite to Conley v. Gibson. 267 This trend is consistent with civil rights
and Title VII decisions issued after Bell Atlantic.268 An individual review
of the cases, however, fails to paint a picture of the federal courts con-
sistently using the plausibility standard to reject ADA claims; instead,
the case law demonstrates that a variety of approaches are now used to
interpret disability allegations. 269 The confusion over the proper plead-
ing standard for disability claims leads to inconsistent results, and can
lead to the dismissal of a case for technical, rather than substantive, rea-
sons.270 If federal judges are unclear as to the appropriate pleading
standard, it is certain that litigants will have even greater difficulties
fashioning and responding to disability complaints.
Unfortunately, the confusion created by the Bell Atlantic decision
will only intensify as the courts struggle to apply the recent amend-
ments to the ADA. Though the plain statutory terms of the ADAAA are
fairly clear, the broader message of the amendments conflicts with the
Bell Atlantic decision.27' Bell Atlantic has lead to a more restrictive read-
265 Lc's Log Cabin, 546 F.3d at 444-45.
266 Congress's first stated purpose of the ADA is "to provide a clear and comprehensive
national mandate for the elimination of discrimination against individuals with disabili-
ties." 42 U.S.C.A. § 12101(b) (1) (West 2005 & Supp. 2009).
267 See supra notes 170-266 and accompanying text.
26 See supra notes 173, 201-266 and accompanying text.
269 Sec supra notes 210-242 and accompanying text.
270 Sec supra notes 243-266 and accompanying text.
271 Sec supra notes 54-60, 173 and accompanying text.
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ing of the pleading requirements, 272 while the ADAAA was intended to
broaden the range of those entitled to bring disability claims.273 These
conflicting signals leave the courts and litigants confused as to how
much specificity is necessary to properly allege an ADA claim.
A uniform pleading standard, therefore, is necessary to assist the
courts and parties in applying the recently enacted ADA amendments
to a disability complaint. A unified analytical framework for pleading
claims of disability discrimination arising in the employment context
would help resolve the majority of confusion that currently exists in this
area of the law, taking the guesswork out of properly alleging a com-
plaint.274 Navigating Bell Atlantic, the recent U.S. Supreme Court deci-
sion in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, and the ADAAA, I propose a uniform pleading
standard that would comply with the Supreme Court decisions and the
amendments to the ADA. Though there are many possible standards, I
attempt to develop an analytical framework for disability claims that is
consistent with the case law, statute, and the federal rules, while not
being overly restrictive of plaintiffs (and still providing adequate notice
to defendants). I am aware of no proposal in the academic literature
for a unified pleading standard for a claim of disability discrimination
brought under Title I of the revised ADA. 275
The proposed uniform framework for alleging claims under the
ADA addresses the two major types of disability discrimination-taking
an adverse action against an individual with a disability, and failing to
reasonably accommodate those workers that have disabilities.276 These
two distinct claims deserve separate analyses, and a proposed pleading
structure for each is discussed in more detail below. Each framework is
intended to serve as a minimum pleading requirement, and litigants are
free to be more descriptive in their complaints than what is proposed
here. 277 It is also important to note at the outset that there are other
possible claims of disability discrimination that are beyond the scope of
this Article, most notably ADA harassment, retaliation, and disparate
2 See supra notes 54-60, 173 and accompanying text.
273 See supra notes 107-169 and accompanying text.
27 See Seiner, supra note 54, at 1042 (arguing for a unified pleading standard for Title
VII cases, and noting that Bell Atlantic "has left the courts guessing as to how the plausibility
standard should be applied").
27 Cf id. at 1042-59 (proposing unified pleading standard for Title VII claims).
276 Scc42 U.S.C.A. § 12112(a)-(b) (West 2005 & Supp. 2009).
277 Plaintiffs should be cautious, however, not to be so descriptive as to plead them-
selves out of court. See, e.g., Am. Nurses' Ass'n v. Illinois, 783 F.2d 716, 724 (7th Cir. 1986)
("A plaintiff who files a long and detailed complaint may plead himself out of court by
including factual allegations which if true show that his legal rights were not invaded.").
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impact (unintentional discrimination) claims, as well as claims for
unlawful medical inquiries. Additionally, the proposed model set forth
here applies specifically to individual claims, rather than to systemic or
class action disability cases. The model proposed below suggests a
framework for evaluating the substantive requirements of an ADA claim
and does not examine questions of jurisdiction or the essential prereq-
uisites to filing a proper lawsuit.2 78 Also, it should be noted that the
EEOC is currently in the process of revising the ADA regulations. 279
Once these regulations are finalized, plaintiffs should make certain that
their pleadings comply with these revised guidelines.
A. Adverse Action Claims
One of the most common forms of disability discrimination brought
in the workplace context occurs when an employer takes an adverse ac-
tion (e.g. termination) against an employee because of that individual's
disability. After the recent amendments to the ADA, the statute is now
clear that it is unlawful for an employer to "discriminate against a quali-
fied individual on the basis of disability."280 An individual can demon-
strate a disability by showing "a physical or mental impairment that sub-
stantially limits one or more of the major life activities of such individ-
ual," that the individual has a record of an impairment, or that the
individual is regarded as having an impairment.28' Moreover, the statute
defines a qualified individual with a disability as "an individual who, with
or without reasonable accommodation, can perform the essential finc-
tions of the employment position that such individual holds or desires."28 2
To satisfy the recently revised statute, an individual alleging that an
employer took an adverse action on the basis of a disability should
therefore allege four elements in the complaint.
1. Coverage
A plaintiff alleging disability discrimination under the ADA should
set forth the victim of the unlawful act and establish coverage under the
statute. Demonstrating coverage is one of the most critical components
278 See Seiner, supra note 54, at 1043, 1050 (discussing contours of proposed Title VII
analytical framework).
279 Sec supra note 149 (noting the notice of proposed rulemaking for revisions to ADA
regulations).
280 42 U.S.C.A. § 12112(a).
281 Id. § 12102(1).
282 Id. § 12111.
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of any disability case, as an individual not covered by the statute will not
be permitted to proceed with her claim.28 3 As already noted above,
there are three ways to demonstrate coverage: by establishing an actual
disability, a record of a disability, or a perceived disability.2M The plain-
tiff should include some detail about the disability in the complaint,
and not rely on a conclusory statement that she is simply "disabled."285
Bell Atlantic holds that plaintiffs must allege enough facts to state a
plausible claim, and a conclusory statement that the plaintiff is "dis-
abled" is therefore inconsistent with this holding.286
More specifically, if the plaintiff is attempting to establish ADA cov-
erage by alleging an actual disability, that individual should first identify
the impairment. The EEOC regulations define an impairment as:
(1) Any physiological disorder, or condition, cosmetic disfig-
urement, or anatomical loss affecting one or more of the fol-
lowing body systems: neurological, musculoskeletal, special
sense organs, respiratory (including speech organs), cardio-
vascular, reproductive, digestive, genito-urinary, hemic and
lymphatic, skin, and endocrine; or
(2) Any mental or psychological disorder, such as mental re-
tardation, organic brain syndrome, emotional or mental ill-
ness, and specific learning disabilities.287
The actual name of the impairment identified by the plaintiff is
not important from a theoretical perspective, though it could prove
critical from a practical standpoint, as seen in the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Seventh Circuit's case, EEOC v. Lee's Log Cabin, discussed in Part
III.D.3. 288 Plaintiffs should therefore be cautious to carefully identify
2ss Id.; see Michael Lee, Scarching for Pattcrns and Anomalies in the ADA Employment Constella-
tion: Who Is a Qualified Individual with a Disability and What Accommodations Are Courts Really
Demanding?, 13 LAB. LAW. 149, 169 (1997) (describing the "disability" definition under stat-
ute as a "threshold issue for coverage under the ADA").
2- 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1).
26 See, e.g., Simpson v. Iowa Health Sys., 2001 WL 34008480, at *4-*5 (N.D. Iowa 2001)
(noting in dicta that an ADA plaintiff must plead more than just the legal conclusion of
having a disability) (citation omitted).
286 See 550 U.S. at 570.
28 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(h) (2009); see supra note 149 (noting notice of proposed rule-
making for revisions to ADA regulations).
288 See supra notes 243-266 and accompanying text. Comparc 546 F.3d 438, 443-44 (ma-
jority opinion) (concluding that distinction between HIV allegation set forth in the com-
plaint and AIDS was critical to the case), With id. at 446-47 (Williams, J., dissenting) (criti-
cizing majority decision and concluding that the "distinction improperly focus[es] on the
name of [the] disability").
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the impairment and plainly set forth any body systems that are affected
as a result of the impairment. Specificity as to the particular impair-
ment will help avoid any argument by the defendant that it failed to
receive notice of the plaintiffs condition in the complaint.2 89
The plaintiff must further allege any major life activities that are
substantially limited by the impairment. 29 o The revised statute explicitly
sets forth many major life activities (though this is not an exhaustive
list), including "caring for oneself, performing manual tasks, seeing,
hearing, eating, sleeping, walking, standing, lifting, bending, speaking,
breathing, learning, reading, concentrating, thinking, communicating,
and working."291 The appendix to the EEOC regulations adds sitting
and reaching to this list.292 The complaint, then, should include the
specific major life activity that is affected by the impairment, and assert
(with any relevant factual detail) that the major life activity identified is
"substantially limited."293 Though many major life activities may be af-
fected and included in the complaint, the revised statute makes clear
that only a single activity must be identified.294
A plaintiff attempting to establish coverage through the "record
of' provision of the statute should clearly set forth that at one time she
either had or was thought to have an actual impairment.295 The ADA
regulations define a "record of" disability as having "a history of, or
[having] been misclassified as having, a mental or physical impairment
that substantially limits one or more major life activities."296 Similar to
coverage under the "actual" provision, then, the plaintiff should clearly
289 Scc supra notes 243-266 and accompanying text.
290 Sec 42 U.S.C.A. § 12102(1) (West 2005 & Supp. 2009); id. § (4) (E) (providing, with
limited exceptions, that "[t] he determination of whether an impairment substantially lim-
its a major life activity shall be made without regard to the ameliorative effects of mitigat-
ing measures").
29I See42 U.S.C.A. § 12102(2).
-2 See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(i); id. pt. 1630 app. 1630.2(i); see supra note 149 (noting no-
tice of proposed rulemaking for revisions to ADA regulations).
29342 U.S.C.A. § 12102(1).
294 Id. § 12102(4) (C). To the extent the plaintiff identifies working as the major life ac-
tivity that is limited, the plaintiff should also indicate (with any relevant factual detail) that
she is substantially limited in performing "either a class ofjobs or a broad range ofjobs in
various classes as compared to the average person having comparable training, skills and
abilities." 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j) (3); see also supra note 149 (noting notice of proposed rule-
making for revisions to ADA regulations). To the extent that the revised ADA regulations
alter the definition of substantially limited in the context of working, plaintiffs should
make certain to comply with the revised guidelines as well as any other changes. See supra
note 149.
295 42 U.S.C. § 12102; 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(k).
296 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(k).
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identify in the complaint the impairment that she either has or was
thought to have, and in what way a major life activity is substantially lim-
ited as a result of that impairment.297 Additionally, the plaintiff should
allege whether she has a history of this impairment or whether she was
"misclassified as having" the impairment.298
Finally, a plaintiff attempting to establish coverage under the "re-
garded as" provision of the statute must allege that the employer per-
ceived her as disabled.299 Similar to the other coverage provisions, a
plaintiff must therefore assert the particular impairment or impair-
ments that form the basis of the employer's adverse employment ac-
tion.3o In contrast to the other two provisions, however, the plaintiff
need allege no more.301 Thus, after the amendments to the ADA, the
plaintiff is no longer required to establish whether "the impairment
limits or is perceived to limit a major life activity."30 2 In light of the
amendments, however, the plaintiff should allege in the complaint that
the perceived impairment is not "transitory" or "minor," and that the
impairment therefore exceeds six months in duration.303 The plaintiff
should further assert any additional facts indicating that the perceived
impairment is not "minor" in scope.30 4
It should further be noted that although the plaintiff may establish
coverage through an actual, a record of, or a perceived disability, there
is nothing in the statute prohibiting the plaintiff from asserting more
than a single basis for coverage.305 Thus, for example, a plaintiff may set
forth in the complaint that she has an actual disability and that the em-
ployer also perceived her as disabled. The plaintiff should be careful,
however, to properly set forth all of the elements for each basis of cov-
erage that is alleged.
2. Identify the Adverse Action
In addition to establishing coverage in the complaint, the plaintiff
must also assert the adverse action that was suffered. In the classic case
29 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1).
28 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(k).
29 42 U.S.C.A. § 12102(1), (3).
s0 Id. § 12102(3).
301 See id.
30
2 Id. § 12102(3) (A).
303 See id. § 12102(3) (B).
3 Id. The statute does not specifically define the term "minor," so any factual support
establishing the severe nature of the perceived impairment should be set forth in the
complaint to help the plaintiff survive this threshold inquiry. Id.
-5 42 U.S.C.A. § 12102(1).
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of McDonnell Douglas Coip. v. Green in 1973, the U.S. Supreme Court re-
quired that an employment discrimination plaintiff include the adverse
action as part of the prima facie case of discrimination.306 Typical ad-
verse actions would include "termination, failure to promote, denial of
transfer, or refusal to hire."307
The federal courts have adopted varying interpretations as to what
constitutes an adverse action, however, and the Supreme Court has
never clearly defined the term.308 Additionally, the ADA enumerates a
number of prohibited adverse actions, including discrimination in "job
application procedures, the hiring, advancement, or discharge of em-
ployees, employee compensation, job training, and other terms, condi-
tions, and privileges of employment."309 The plaintiff should therefore
make certain that the asserted adverse action is either expressly set forth
in the statute or clearly recognized in the jurisdiction where the com-
plaint is filed. The description of the adverse action should also be suffi-
ciently detailed to provide the defendant with notice as to what consti-
tutes the alleged wrongdoing. Certainly, letting the employer know what
it has done wrong is a critical component of the complaint.310
Additionally, the plaintiff should set forth the approximate time(s)
that the discriminatory act(s) took place. Although the plaintiff may
not be certain of the exact date and time of the wrongdoing, she
should assert her best estimate of when the discrimination occurred.
This requirement not only assists the employer in investigating the al-
so6 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973) (requiring, in a failure to hire case, that plaintiff show
that, despite his qualifications, he was rejected").
307 Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 114 (2002) (discussing discrete
acts of discrimination).
sos See, e.g., Ernest Lidge It, The Meaning ofDiscrimination: Why Courts HaveErred in Re-
quiring Employment Discimnination Plaintiffs to Prove That the Employer's Action Was Aaterially
Adverse or Ultimate, 47 U. KAN. L. REv. 333, 346 (1999) (discussing approaches of courts in
interpreting adverse action); Seiner, supra note 54, at 1045-46 (discussing adverse action
in Title VII context and noting that the Supreme Court has not defined what constitutes
an adverse action).
- 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a).
310 The complaint should similarly make clear that it is the employer that took the ad-
verse action. This statement "implicitly alleg(es] that the defendant falls within the defini-
tion of 'employer' under" the statute. Seiner, supra note 54, at 1047 n.240. Nonetheless, a
cautious litigant should further set forth in the complaint the rationale for the employer's
coverage under the ADA, though the prerequisites to bringing an ADA claim are beyond
the scope of this Article, which focuses on the substantive requirements of bringing a dis-
ability claim. Id.
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leged discrimination, but it further allows the court to determine if the
plaintiff's claim is timely.31 1
3. Establish Qualification
The ADA requires the victim of the discrimination to be a "quali-
fied individual."312 Following the amendments to the ADA, a qualified
individual is defined as "an individual who, with or without reasonable
accommodation, can perform the essential functions of the employ-
ment position that such individual holds or desires."313 The plaintiff
should therefore set forth in the complaint that she is qualified because
she can perform the essential functions of the position. The plaintiff
should also allege whether an accommodation is required to perform
the job fuinctions, or whether she can accomplish these tasks without an
accommodation. If the plaintiff is able to provide any factual description
regarding her ability to perform the essential job functions (e.g. "I have
been performing this position successfully for the past 6 months."), it
would firther enhance her claim.
4. Discrimination Was "On the Basis" of Disability
The final component of-the proposed analytical pleading frame-
work requires the plaintiff to establish causation-showing that the dis-
criminatory act was taken because of the plaintiffs disability. The re-
vised statute prohibits taking an adverse action "against a qualified indi-
vidual on the basis of disability."31 4 The plaintiff must therefore allege
the causal link between the discrimination and the disability itself, and
include in the complaint that the employer's action was taken "on the
basis" of the plaintiffs disability.315 Establishing the employer's dis-
criminatory intent in a case can be the most difficult hurdle for an em-
3" SceHamerav. County of Berks, 248 Fed. Appx. 422, 424 (3d Cir. 2007) ("In order to
bring a civil action under Title VII, a plaintiff must first file a complaint with the EEOC. A
plaintiff has 180 days to file a charge of employment discrimination pursuant to Title VII
with the EEOC, or 300 days if proceedings were initiated with an appropriate local or state
authority."); Seiner, supra note 54, at 1045-46 (discussing the timing of the adverse action
for Title VII claims).
312 42 U.S.C.A. § 12112(a) (West 2005 & Stipp. 2009) ("No covered entity shall dis-
criminate against a qualified individual on the basis of disability.") (emphasis added).
313 Id. § 12111(8).
31, Id. § 12112(a).
315 Id.
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ployee to overcome.316 For purposes of the pleading stage of the litiga-
tion, however, simply alleging the causal link between the adverse ac-
tion and the disability should be sufficient to allow the case to proceed,
as adequate notice is given to the defendant of the perceived discrimi-
nation, and as the proposed model also requires that the critical facts of
the claim are included in the complaint. The sample pleading form
found in the appendix to the federal rules makes clear that merely al-
leging causation is sufficient to state a claim under the rules, when
other relevant facts are also included in the allegations.317
Plaintiffs should also consider the Supreme Court's 2009 decision
in Ashcroft v. Iqbalwhen alleging intent.318 In Iqbal, the Court noted that
when determining whether discriminatory intent has been sufficiently
alleged, the "factual context" of the complaint should be considered.319
The Court further advised that a plaintiff cannot "plead the bare ele-
ments of his cause of action . . . and expect his complaint to survive a
motion to dismiss."320 The facts required by the proposed pleading
framework set forth above should provide sufficient "factual context"
for any adverse action ADA claim. This proposed pleading framework
requires a plaintiff to assert the essential facts of the disability claim,
thereby avoiding the general and conclusory allegations of discrimina-
tion that Iqbal prohibits.32' Nonetheless, it will be important for litigants
to follow the lower courts' interpretations of the recent Iqbal decision
and to modify their pleadings depending upon the case law of the par-
ticular jurisdiction.322
It should also be noted that the original statute prohibited dis-
crimination "because of the disability, "32 3 which was subsequently re-
vised by the ADAAA to prohibit discrimination "on the basis of disabil-
316 Scc, e.g., Regenbogen . Mustille, 908 F. Supp. 1101, 1116 (N.D.N.Y 1995) (noting
that intent in employment discrimination case "is notoriously difficult to prove."); see also
Seiner, supra note 54, at 1046-47 (discussing intent requirement for Title VII claims).
31 SecFED. R. Cry. P. app. of forms 11 ("On date, at place, the defendant negligently drove
a motor vehicle against the plaintiff. As a result, the plaintiff was physically injured . . .
18 See generally 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009).
319 Id. at 1954.
320 Id.
321 Id.
322 In light of Iqbal, plaintiffs may also want to consider rebutting in the complaint the
reason the employer gave for taking the adverse action. See id. at 1950-51 (noting factual
scenarios which are "more likely" than those alleged by Iqbal and Bell Atlantic plaintiffs).
Though this should in no way be considered a requirement of the complaint, it may en-
hance the overall allegations in certain circumstances by discrediting the employer's
more likely" explanation. See id.; Seiner, supra note 73, at 33-49 (proposing unified plead-
ing model for alleging discriminatory intent in Title VII cases).
323 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (2006).
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ity"324 It remains to be seen what, if any, impact this change in termi-
nology will have on the way that disability cases are decided.
B. Suminay ofAdverse Action Analytical Framework
This proposed four-part framework for pleading all adverse action
claims of discrimination under the ADA is deliberately straightforward
and simple. The proposal was designed to provide a minimum pleading
standard for litigants that complies with the recent amendments to the
ADA, as well as the Supreme Court's plausibility standard as set forth in
Bell Atlantic (and confirmed by Iqbal). This proposed pleading standard
should not be particularly burdensome for plaintiffs, as all of the re-
quired information should be within their knowledge when the com-
plaint is filed.325 At the same time, the facts provided in the complaint
under this model are sufficient to state a "plausible" claim of disability
discrimination and provide the defendant with adequate notice of the
alleged wrongdoing.326 In summary, a plaintiff alleging that her em-
ployer took an adverse action against her on the basis of her disability
must set forth in the complaint the following four factors:
1. The victim of the discrimination and the basis for coverage;
2. The adverse action and the approximate time that it oc-
curred;
3. That the individual was qualified; and
4. That the adverse action was taken on the basis of the indi-
vidual's disability.
An example of an allegation satisfying these four elements and
providing a sufficient disability discrimination claim under the ADA
would be:
I am paralyzed from the waist down, and I am substantially
limited in the major life activity of walking. On July 11, 2009,
my employer discriminated against me by failing to promote
me to a supervisory position for which I applied. I am quali-
fied for the position as I have previously performed all of the
essential functions of the job successfully without any accom-
32 42 U.S.C.A. § 12112(a) (West 2005 & Supp. 2009).
325 See Seiner, supra note 54, at 1047-50, 1052 (discussing information available to em-
ployment discrimination plaintiff when complaint is filed, and providing summary of pro-
posed framework for alleging Title VII claims).
326 See Bell Atlantic, 550 U.S. at 570.
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modation, and the decision not to promote was made on the
basis of my disability.
Though simple, this allegation complies with the proposed plead-
ing framework as it asserts the victim ("I" or the individual signing the
complaint), the basis for coverage (paralysis limiting the ability to
walk), the adverse action and time that it occurred (failure to promote
on July 11, 2009), the plaintiffs qualifications (able to perform essen-
tial job functions without accommodation), and causation (decision
was made "on the basis of my disability."). Thus, the brief statement
provides all of the elements of a plausible ADA claim, and gives the de-
fendant sufficient notice of its alleged wrongdoing. No more is re-
quired under the revised ADA, the Bell Atlantic and Iqbal decisions, or
the federal rules.32 7
C. Failure to Accommodate Claims
A second pleading framework is required for a distinct ADA allega-
tion-a failure to accommodate claim. The ADA defines discrimination
to include "not making reasonable accommodations to the known
physical or mental limitations of an otherwise qualified individual with
a disability" absent a showing of undue hardship.328 The statute pro-
vides further guidance on what constitutes a reasonable accommoda-
tion, stating that it may include:
[M]aking existing facilities used by employees readily accessi-
ble to . . . individuals with disabilities; and . . . job restructur-
ing, part-time or modified work schedules, reassignment to a
vacant position, acquisition or modification of equipment or
devises, appropriate adjustment or modifications of examina-
tions, training materials or policies, the provision of qualified
readers or interpreters . . . . 329
With these statutory provisions in mind, I propose the following
analytical framework for pleading all ADA reasonable accommodation
3 It should be emphasized, however, that plaintiffs must make certain also to comply
with the revised EEOC ADA regulations, when those guidelines are finalized by the agency.
See supra note 149.
328 42 U.S.C.A. § 12112(b) (5) (A). The ADA further prohibits "denying employment
opportunities to a job applicant or employee who is an otherwise qualified individual with
a disability, if such denial is based on the need of such covered entity to make reasonable
accommodation to the physical or mental impairments of the employee or applicant." Id.
§ 12112(b) (5) (B).
32 9 Id. § 12111(9).
2010]1 139
HeinOnline  -- 51 B.C. L. Rev. 139 2010
Boston College Law Review
claims. This five-part proposed pleading standard sets forth the mini-
mum facts necessary for a plaintiff to state a plausible claim, while pro-
viding the defendant with adequate notice of the allegations.
1. Coverage
Similar to establishing an ADA adverse action claim, reasonable
accommodation claims require the plaintiff to allege a disability.330 Rea-
sonable accommodation claims, however, differ in one significant as-
pect: a plaintiff is not entitled to an accommodation if that individual's
only basis for coverage under the statute is that the employer regarded
the plaintiff as disabled.331 Thus, the ADA is now clear that an employer
"need not provide a reasonable accommodation" to an employee "who
meets the definition of disability . .. solely under" the regarded-as defi-
nition.3 3 2 This distinction between adverse action claims and reasonable
accommodation claims reflects a significant revision to the statute
through the ADAAA," and resolves a prior circuit split on the issue of
whether an employer must accommodate an individual that it perceives
as disabled.334
A plaintiff alleging that an employer failed to make a reasonable
accommodation must therefore establish coverage under the ADA
through either the actual or record-of prongs of the statute.335 A plain-
tiff can thus demonstrate coverage by establishing "a physical or mental
impairment that substantially limits one or more of the major life activi-
ties of such individual."336 Alternatively, the plaintiff can demonstrate "a
record of such an impairment."337 A plaintiffs allegations regarding
actual or record-of disability would proceed identically to the frame-
work discussed for adverse action claims.338 Again, nothing would pro-
hibit the plaintiff from alleging both an actual disability and a record of
a disability.339
so See supra notes 280-282 and accompanying text.
331 42 U.S.C.A. § 12201(h) (West 2005 & Supp. 2009).
332 Id.
33 See Pub. L. No. 110-325, § 6, 122 Stat. 3553 (2008).
334 See, e.g., Rosenthal, supra note 169, at 897 (discussing circuit split on the issue of
whether an employer must accommodate an individual that it regards as disabled).
33 5 42 U.S.C.A. § 12102(1) (A)-(B).
336 Id. § 12102(1) (A).
3 Id. § 12102(1) (B).
338 See supra notes 283-305 and accompanying text.
3 See supra notes 283-305 and accompanying text.
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2. Establish Qualification
The ADA makes it unlawful to fail to accommodate "an otherwise
qualified individual with a disability." 40 A qualified individual under
the ADA is "an individual who, with or without reasonable accommoda-
tion, can perform the essential functions of the employment position
that such individual holds or desires."341 A plaintiff would establish that
she is qualified under the statute in the same manner that a plaintiff
would for an adverse action claim-by setting forth in the complaint
that she is able to complete the essential functions of the position, and
by indicating whether a reasonable accommodation is necessary to per-
form the tasks of the job.342 Again, providing further factual support
indicating the plaintiffs ability to complete the job functions would
strengthen the individual's claim.3 43
3. A Reasonable Accommodation Was Requested
The plaintiff must also set forth in the complaint that an accom-
modation was requested and that the requested accommodation was
reasonable. The statute is clear that the employer's obligation to ac-
commodate an employee's disability only relates to reasonable accommo-
dations. 344 What a reasonable accommodation is will turn significantly
on the facts of the particular case.345 The Supreme Court has provided
some guidance on the issue, noting that a reasonable accommodation is
one that "seems reasonable on its face, i.e., ordinarily or in the run of
cases. "346
For purposes of the complaint, the plaintiff should explain exactly
what accommodation was being sought, the approximate date of the
request, and that the request was reasonable. To the extent the plaintiff
is requesting an accommodation enumerated by the statute as a poten-
tially reasonable accommodation (e.g. asking for an interpreter or a
modified schedule), 47 the plaintiff should also indicate this fact in the
complaint. And, if there is federal case law supporting the accommoda-
34o 42 U.S.C.A. § 12112 (b) (5) (A).
34 Id. § 12111(8).
o See supra notes 314-317 and accompanying text.
34 See supra notes 314-317 and accompanying text.
34 42 U.S.C.A. § 12112(b) (5) (A).
34 See, e.g., Garcia-Ayala v. Lederle Parenterals, Inc., 212 F.3d 638, 652 (1st Cir. 2000)
("'Reasonable accommodation' is also a capacious term, purposefully broad so as to per-
mit appropriate case-by-case flexibility.").
346 U.S. Airways, Inc. v. Barnett, 535 U.S. 391, 401 (2002).
-7 42 U.S.C.A. § 12111(9).
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tion as reasonable, the plaintiff should indicate that the request is rea-
sonable "in the run of cases."348 Finally, if the plaintiff's condition pre-
vented her from making a formal accommodation request, the plaintiff
should also indicate this fact in the complaint. Though the employer is
generally not obligated to provide an accommodation where an indi-
vidual does not request one, there may be circumstances where this
general rule does not apply.349
4. The Accommodation Was Rejected by the Employer
In the complaint, the plaintiff must also assert that the requested
accommodation was rejected by the employer, and she should further
provide the date of that rejection.350 In making this assertion, the plain-
tiff should indicate that she either engaged in the "interactive process"
with the employer by participating in an open dialogue about the re-
quest, or she attempted to do so but her efforts were rebuffed.35 1 Pur-
suant to the federal regulations, the interactive process should be de-
signed to "identify the precise limitations resulting from the disability
and potential reasonable accqmmodations that could overcome those
limitations."352
Additionally, the employee is not necessarily entitled to the par-
ticular accommodation that she requests, if other reasonable accom-
38 Barnctt, 535 U.S. at 401.
4 Sce EEOC Notice, EEOC Enforcement Guidance: Reasonable Accommodation and
Undue Hardship Under the Americans with Disabilities Act, Notice 915.002, at No. 40 (Oct.
17, 2002), availabk at http://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/accommodation.htm [hereinafter
ADA Enforcement Guidance] ("As a general rule., the individual with a disability-who has
the most knowledge about the need for reasonable accommodation-must inform the
employer that an accommodation is needed ... . However, an employer should initiate the
reasonable accommodation interactive process without being asked if the employer: (1)
knows that the employee has a disability, (2) knows, or has reason to know, that the employee
is experiencing workplace problems because of the disability, and (3) knows, or has reason to
know, that the disability prevents the employee from requesting a reasonable accom-
modation."); see also Selected Enforcement Guidance and Other Policy Documents on the
ADA, www.eeoc.gov/ada/adadocs.html (last visited Dec. 1, 2009) (noting that EEOC will be
reevaluating its ADA publications in light of the ADAAA).
350 Similar to adverse action claims discussed above, a plaintiff should allege in the
complaint (as a prerequisite to suit) that the employer is covered under the provisions of
the ADA. See supra note 310.
351 Sec ADA Enforcement Guidance, supra note 349, at No. I ("A request for reason-
able accommodation is the first step in an informal, interactive process between the indi-
vidual and the employer.").
3 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o) (3) (2009).
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modations exist.353 Rather, the company can "choose among reasonable
accommodations as long as the chosen accommodation is effective."354
Thus, the plaintiff should indicate in the complaint that the requested
accommodation was rejected and that the defendant failed to offer any
reasonable, effective alternative.355
5. The Accommodation Does Not Cause an Undue Hardship
Finally; the plaintiff should assert in the complaint that the accom-
modation does not result in an undue hardship for the employer,
though such an allegation should be considered optional for the plain-
tiff's complaint.35 6 An employer need not provide an accommodation
to an employee if the accommodation would cause an undue hard-
ship.35 7 The statute defines undue hardship as "an action requiring sig-
nificant difficulty or expense,"358 when considering such factors as the
nature of the request, the resources of the employer and facility, and
the type of operations of the business.359
The burden of proof on the issue of undue hardship rests with the
employe, which, under the statute, must "demonstrate that the accom-
modation would impose" this burden.360 The Supreme Court has fur-
ther advised that once a plaintiff shows that the accommodation is rea-
sonable, "the defendant/employer then must show special (typically
case-specific) circumstances that demonstrate undue hardship in the
particular circumstances."361 Nonetheless, the employee is likely aware
of numerous facts about the cost of the accommodation, the type of
business of the employer, and the resources of the facility362 The plain-
3 Sec ADA Enforcement Guidance, supra note 349, at No. 9 (discussing employer's
obligation to provide a reasonable accommodation).
35 Id.
55 Sec id. ("[A]s part of the interactive process, the employer may offer alternative
suggestions for reasonable accommodations and discuss their effectiveness in removing
the workplace barrier that is impeding the individual with a disability.").
356 Sec infra notes 365-366 and accompanying text.
3 Sec 42 U.S.C.A. § 12112(b) (5) (A) (West 2005 & Supp. 2009) (noting that an em-
ployer must provide reasonable accommodation to an employee "unless such covered
entity can demonstrate that the accommodation would impose an undue hardship on the
operation of the business of such covered entity").
358 See id. § 12111(10) (A).
3 Scc id. § 12111(10) (B). The statute sets forth numerous factors to consider as part
of the undue hardship analysis, and these factors should all be analyzed in determining
the existence of an undue hardship. See id.
s3o Id. § 12112 (b) (5) (A).
361 Barnctt, 535 U.S. at 402.
362 See 42 U.S.C. § 12111(10) (B).
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tiff should therefore include a statement in the complaint that the ac-
commodation does not result in an undue hardship to the employer,
and the plaintiff should further provide any additional facts on this is-
sue as deemed appropriate under the circumstances of the case.363
Thus, alleging facts related to the undue hardship question should be
deemed optional for the plaintiffs complaint as the burden of proof on
this question rests with the employer.364 I believe, however, that provid-
ing some underlying facts regarding the lack of an undue hardship
early in the litigation would enhance the plaintiffs overall claim.
D. Smary ofReasonable Accommodation Analytical Framework
Similar to the proposed pleading framework for adverse action
claims, the proposed model set forth above for reasonable accommo-
dation claims is deliberately simple. The suggested analytical frame-
work is designed to provide a blueprint for the parties to easily assure
that they have complied with the pleading requirements of the statute
and federal rules. The model serves as a minimum threshold for
pleading an ADA case, and a plaintiff setting forth the following five
factors would satisfy both the revised statute and the plausibility plead-
ing standard of Bell Atlantic and Iqbal:
1. The victim of the discrimination and the basis for coverage;
2. That the individual was qualified;
3. That a reasonable accommodation was requested;
4. That the accommodation was rejected by the employer; and
5. That the accommodation does not result in an undue hard-
ship. i i
The simplicity of the reasonable accommodation analytical frame-
work can also be seen through the following example of a disability alle-
gation that would satisfy the pleading requirements of the federal rules:
I am blind and substantially limited in the major life activity of
seeing. I am qualified for my position as a technician and have
performed my job successfully for over a year. On July 1, 2009,
I requested that my employer reasonably accommodate me by
providing voice recognition software for my computer. This
363 Scc Barnett, 535 U.S. at 402 (discussing fact-specific nature of undue hardship in-
quiry).
3 As the employer bears the burden of proof on the question of undue hardship, a
court should not dismiss a complaint that fails to allege that the accommodation does not
result in an undue hardship.
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software is inexpensive and would not result in an undue
hardship to my employer. However, the request was denied on
July 15, 2009, and no alternative accommodation was offered
as my employer failed to engage in an interactive process.
The above example thus demonstrates that only a few factual as-
sertions are necessary to comply with the proposed analytical frame-
work for pleading reasonable accommodation claims under the ADA. A
plaintiff that complies with the proposed model, however, will also have
satisfied the requirements of Bell Atlantic, Iqbal, and the ADA as revised
by the ADAAA.3 65 No further detail is necessary for purposes of the
complaint.366
V. IMPLICATIONS OF PROPOSED PLEADING FRAMEWORK
The proposed analytical model for pleading disability claims would
have several implications for ADA litigants and the courts.36 7 Perhaps
the most significant benefit of the proposal would be the elimination of
the confusion that currently exists in analyzing disability claims. As al-
ready discussed, the courts have taken varying approaches to ADA
claims after Twombly v. Bell Atlantic Coip., and the complex amendments
to the ADA have only added to the confusion.368 Through a unified ap-
proach to disability claims, litigants and the courts can easily determine
whether a plaintiffs complaint satisfies the proposed model. If a com-
plaint is deficient in some way, the shortcoming would be easily identi-
fied and a plaintiff could be given an opportunity to amend the plead-
ings to come into compliance. If a plaintiff is unable to do so, then the
complaint should be rejected under the statute and Supreme Court case
law for failing to state a plausible ADA claim. Thus, the proposed model
simplifies the overly complex pleading process that currently exists and
provides a clear-cut framework for the courts and litigants to apply.369
The streamlined approach of the proposed analytical framework
will also save judicial resources through the simplified pleading process.
Through a unified pleading standard, the parties will spend less time
365 Scc Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1937; BellAtlantic, 550 U.S. at 544.
366 It should be emphasized again, however, that plaintiffs must make certain to also
comply with the revised EEOC ADA regulations, when those guidelines are finalized by the
agency. Scc supra note 149.
367 SecSeiner, supra note 54, at 1053-59 (providing similar discussion of implications of
implementing proposed pleading model for Title VII employment discrimination claims).
368 See supra notes 206-274 and accompanying text.
369 See Seiner, supra note 54, at 1053 (discussing benefit of "simplicity" when using uni-
fied pleading framework for Title VII claims).
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fighting over the necessary requirements of the complaint, and the
courts will therefore spend less effort resolving these disputes. A more
straightforward approach to the process also makes it easier for plain-
tiffs to properly allege a complaint in the first instance, again saving the
parties time and effort in not having to redraft a complaint or respond
to multiple pleadings. Additionally, through the proposed model, a
court can more quickly determine the sufficiency of a complaint by
comparing the plaintiffs pleadings against the unified standard.370
Similarly, the proposed model would lead to more uniformity in
the pleading process and therefore more predictability as to the ulti-
mate success or failure of a plaintiffs claim. More certainty and pre-
dictability in the process "increases the likelihood of settlement be-
tween parties," which can result in "reduced litigation costs."371 Less
litigation and an increased rate of settlement would likely benefit all of
the parties, as well as the entire judicial system through a reduced em-
ployment discrimination case load.37 2
The proposed pleading model also offers a significant benefit to
plaintiffs by reducing the likelihood of a procedural misstep that would
result in the dismissal of the case. As we saw in the U.S. Court of Ap-
peals for the Seventh Circuit's decision in EEOC v. Lee's Log Cabin, even
the manner in which the impairment is characterized in the complaint
can lead to the rejection of the plaintiffs entire case.3 73 The model set
forth above provides a clear blueprint for plaintiffs to follow, thereby
reducing the chance that a key component of the case will be inadver-
tently omitted from the pleadings.
Finally, although there is significant disagreement over the implica-
tions of the Bell Atlantic decision and the Supreme Court's plausibility
pleading standard,374 commentators seem to agree that the decision
370 See Seiner, supra note 54, at 1054-55 (discussing benefit of saving judicial resources
when using unified pleading framework for Title VII claims).
371 Seiner, supra note 176, at 790 (citation omitted). Sec generally Richard B. Stewart,
The Discontents of Legalism: Interest Group Relations in Administrative Regulation, 1985 Wis. L.
REv. 655, 662 ("The more certain the law-the less the variance in expected outcomes-
the more likely the parties will predict the same outcome from litigation, and the less likely
that litigation will occur because of differences in predicted outcomes.").
372 See Seiner, supra note 54, at 1055 (discussing how uniformity in pleading can lead to
possibility of more settlements early in case).
3 Sec supra notes 250-274 and accompanying text.
3 Hannon, supra note 54, at 1824 ("In analyzing Two mbly and EDickson, the commenta-
tor response to the decision has run the gamut. On one end, a number of writers have
concluded that Twombly is best understood as a decision extending only to pleading in
antitrust contexts. At the other end, writers believe that Toibly signals a revolutionary
overhaul of the entire concept of notice pleading.").
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"means an increase in the litigation over pleadings before federal district
courts."3 75 Similarly, more litigation can be expected to result from the
amendments to the ADA, as the courts struggle to determine how the
complex revisions impact disability claims.376 The proposed analytical
framework would eliminate the need for much of this litigation, as a
clear standard would be established for disability claims. The simple test
set forth above would answer the question of what plausibility means in
the disability context and resolve any confusion as to whether a plaintiffs
complaint is in compliance with the recent revisions to the ADA. Thus,
adopting the proposed model would head off a significant amount of
disability litigation that is almost certain to follow from the ADA.AA and
recent Supreme Court pleading decisions.
Some might argue, though, that the proposed analytical frame-
work creates too low of a threshold for plaintiffs to satisfy. It is true that
the model creates a simple and straightforward pleading standard. The
notice pleading requirement of the federal rules, however, was not in-
tended to create an onerous burden for plaintiffs.3 77 The proposed
model set forth in this Article carefully constiucts a framework for
pleading a plausible claim of disability discrimination under the ADA.
The standard therefore comports with the Bell Atlantic and Ashcroft v.
Iqbal decisions, the amendments to the ADA, and the federal rules.
Under the proposed framework, a defendant will receive facts relating
to the victim, the victim's qualifications, the basis for coverage tinder
the statute, the type of disability discrimination that is alleged, when the
discrimination occurred, and the causal link between the employer's
action and the discrimination.373 In the aggregate, these facts certainly
provide the defendant with fair notice of the claim against it and en-
able the employer to begin an investigation into the matter.379
375 See id. at 1824-25. Sc gcncrallySeiner, supra note 54.
376 See Long, supra note 4, at 229 ("Whether these amendments [to the ADA] will pro-
duce dramatic changes in terms of the overall effectiveness of the ADA, however, remains
to be seen.").
3 See, e.g., Christopher Fairman, Heightened Pleading, 81 TEx. L. REv. 551, 561 (2002)
("The Rule 8(a)(2) mandate that a federal pleading be 'a short and plain statement of a
claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief' requires that a claim be stated with
brevity, conciseness, and clarity. The Rule was designed to avoid technicalities." (citing 5
CHARLEs ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEpERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 1215
(3d ed. 2004))).
37 Sec supra notes 367-377 and accompanying text; infra notes 379-383 and accompa-
nying text.
37 See Seiner, supra note 54, at 1056 (discussing proposed Title VII pleading frame-
work and information necessary for employer to investigate discrimination allegations); see
also EEOC v.J.H. Routh Packing Co., 246 F.3d 850, 854 (6th Cir, 2001) ("An accusation of
2010] 147
HeinOnline  -- 51 B.C. L. Rev. 147 2010
Boston College Law Review
Similarly, it could be argued that the proposed approach requires
too much of the plaintiff and that pleading numerous facts relating to
the claim goes beyond the requirements of notice pleading.380 Al-
though a valid concern, the Bell Atlantic and Iqbal decisions are clear
that a factual basis for the plaintiffs claim must be set forth in the
complaint.381 The proposed model attempts to formulate a minimum
standard of factual pleading for disability plaintiffs, thus requiring the
pleading of only those facts that would be essential to any ADA claim.
Most importantly, however, all of the required facts of the pleading
proposal should be within the plaintiffs knowledge at the time that the
complaint is filed. The framework does not create any significant bur-
den for plaintiffs-rather, it simply requires that they clearly and con-
cisely frame the basic elements of their disability claims.
One additional potential concern of adopting a unified pleading
framework is that it may result in an increase in meritless litigation. A
system that is simple and easier for litigants to understand may indeed
result in more litigants availing themselves of that system, regardless of
the merit of their claims. Although it is possible that adopting a uni-
form pleading standard would result in an increase in frivolous disabil-
ity claims, much of this litigation would be eliminated as the cases pro-
ceed in litigation. Additionally although the proposed framework may
result in some additional expense, "this is unfortunately the cost that
must be incurred by the judicial system to make certain that legitimate
claims are not unfairly dismissed."382 It is worth noting that the new sys-
discrimination on the basis of a particular impairment provides the defendant with suffi-
cient notice to begin its defense against the claim."). It should also be considered that
ADA plaintiffs must "file a charge of discrimination with the EEOC prior to bringing suit,
and defendants receive notice of this charge." Seiner, supra note 54, at 1049 n.253. Thus,
the employer "typically will have received [at least some] notice of the allegation of dis-
crimination long before a federal complaint is ever filed." Id.; accord 42 U.S.C.A.
§ 12117(a) (West 2005 & Supp. 2009) ("The powers, remedies, and procedures set forth in
sections 2000e-4, 2000e-5, 2000e-6, 2000e-8, and 2000e-9 of this title shall be the powers,
remedies, and procedures this subchapter provides ... to any person alleging discrimina-
tion on the basis of disability in violation of any provision of this chapter . . . .").
3 See Seiner, supro note 54, at 1056 (discussing potential concern that proposed Title
VII pleading framework "is too onerous for plaintiffs").
381 Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009) (noting that the federal rules "de-
mand[] more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation");
Twombly v. Bell Atlantic Corp., 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007) (complaint must allege "enough
facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face").
3 Seiner, supra note 54, at 1057; see also Elaine Korb & Richard Bales, A Pcrmanent Stop
Sign: Why Courts Should Yield to the Tmptation to Impose Heightened Pleading Standards in
§ 1983 Cases, 41 BRANDEIs L.J. 267, 293-94 (2002) (arguing against rigid pleading stan-
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tem could likely absorb some additional costs, as the simplicity of the
unified pleading framework will result in the saving of significant judi-
cial resources, as discussed above. Furthermore, as the Supreme Court
has even acknowledged, the "simplified notice pleading standard relies
on liberal discovery rules and summary judgment motions to define
disputed facts and issues and to dispose of unmeritorious claims."383
In the end, the proposed analytical framework set forth in this Ar-
ticle would bring simplicity to a complex pleading process. A clear,
concise and coherent standard for asserting disability claims would
yield a number of benefits to the courts and litigants that would far
outweigh any potential concerns. The growing uncertainty in this area
of the law must be addressed, and adopting a unified pleading standard
would be the best way to resolve the current confusion surrounding the
pleading of disability claims.
CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court's Bell Atlanticdecision and the amendments to
the ADA have left disability pleading in disarray, and the Court's recent
Iqbal ruling only adds to this confusion. As the law further develops in
this area, there is likely to be increased litigation and sharp division
over how the revised statute and Supreme Court case law should be ap-
plied to disability plaintiffs. If adopted, the analytical framework for
analyzing disability claims set forth in this Article would help resolve
much of the confusion in this area of the law and potentially prevent a
great deal of unnecessary litigation on these issues. An individual with a
disability encountering discrimination in employment should not face
a burdensome process when trying to state a claim against an employer.
A uniform pleading model is therefore needed to streamline the proc-
ess, to create a clear approach for plaintiffs to follow, and to eliminate
the guesswork currently involved in preparing a disability complaint.
"We know that equality of individual ability has never existed and
never will, but we do insist that equality of opportunity still must be
sought."a3 8 A simplified pleading model will help those with disabilities
secure equal rights and opportunities and more fully avail themselves
of the protections set forth in the ADA.
dards and stating that "(t] he interests of all should not be sacrificed for the benefit of a
few").
383 Swierkiewicz v. Sorema, 534 U.S. 506, 512 (2002).
34 5 PUBLIC PAPERS AND ADDRESSES OF FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT 200-02 (1938).
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